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Abstract 
This paper examines the question, “How can the US best engage authoritarian 
governments in Africa militarily, in order to facilitate more positive outcomes for that 
country’s citizens?”  In order to answer this, it is necessary to examine the presumption 
that authoritarian governments do not promote positive outcomes for their constituents.  
If this is not the case, then it may be possible to use different, non-traditional means in 
order to identify positive performance indicators.  This can lead to a more holistic 
assessment, and allow the US to leverage the resources of the military to further promote 
these outcomes.   
In this thesis, I argue that if it is possible for an authoritarian government to 
facilitate positive outcomes for its people, it may be possible to craft a military 
engagement plan so that the US military can help continue this cycle.  The benefits of a 
well-crafted engagement plan can improve the lives of that country’s citizens, and 
improve governance by its leaders.  For the everyday people in these countries, the 
consequences of a poorly-crafted plan could hardly be worse. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
From the time European colonialists first started expanding their territory in the 
1400s, they wrote about the perceived backwardness of the natives, and their lack of 
development.  Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, the official historian of the Spanish Court in 
1547, argued that Amerindians in newly-conquered territories of the New World were 
“dim-witted and mentally lazy, although they may be physically strong enough to fulfill 
all the necessary tasks, [they] are by nature slaves.”1  Other writers referred to indigenous 
people as “suffering under satanic oppression, ignorance and disease, effected by a 
combination of political, economic and religious forces that cooperate under a regime 
seeking the benefit of both ruler and ruled.”2  It is noteworthy that these attitudes are by 
no means relegated to a distant, ignorant, and racist past: In 2007, Nobel Price-winning 
geneticist James Watson stated that he was “inherently gloomy about the prospect of 
Africa” because “all our social policies are based on the fact that [Africans’] intelligence 
is the same as ours—whereas all the testing says not really.”3   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 University of Houston, “Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda,” Digital History, 
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/learning_history/spain/spain_sepulveda.cfm (accessed June 12, 
2012). 
2 Toyin Falola, Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies 
(Rochester: University Rochester Press, 2001), 33. 
3 Cahal Milmo, “Fury at DNA Pioneer's Theory: Africans are Less Intelligent Than Westerners,” 
The Independent, October 17, 2007, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/fury-at-dna-
pioneers-theory-africans-are-less-intelligent-than-westerners-394898.html (accessed June 14, 
2012). 
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As a result of this view, for years governments, missionaries, and adventurers saw 
venturing into the heart of Africa—the “Dark Continent”—as a noble and worthy 
undertaking.4  Belgium’s King Leopold II, self-described alternatively as the “King-
Sovereign” or “proprietor” of the Belgian Congo (later Zaire, and then the Democratic 
Republic of Congo), said, “To open to civilization the only part of our globe which it has 
not yet penetrated, to pierce the darkness which hangs over entire peoples, is, I dare say, a 
crusade worthy of this century of progress.”5  Arguments about the benefits of “civilizing 
the natives” rested on the presupposition that they were not civilized, and that Africa 
remained behind an ideal that Europeans had conveniently already achieved.  It is 
through this skewed lens that outsiders viewed Africa, drew conclusions about her status, 
and made policy decisions.   
The decisions that European colonial powers made, particularly in the wake of the 
“Scramble for Africa” in the late 1800s, had stark implications for both colonizers and 
Africans themselves.  This sense of “going to Africa to fix Africa” continues in 
contemporary times with aid programs like those criticized by Dambisa Moyo in her 
book Dead Aid.  In it, she argues that well-intentioned aid has actually contributed to 
problems in Africa by enabling corruption among elites, exacerbating conflict, and 
creating a poverty cycle.  In short, misconceptions about Africa have only made things 
there worse. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 For purposes of this thesis, “Africa” and “Sub-Saharan Africa” will be used interchangeably, in 
reference to the 48 countries there, though not North Africa. 
5 Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial 
Africa (New York: Haughton Mifflin, 1999), 87 and 44. 
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All of this is not to say that it is difficult to find indicators of poor performance by 
the 48 countries of the continent.  In many areas, state capacity is extremely limited, and 
in human rights, development, health, and others, the continent lags behind many areas of 
the world.  They make up 30% of the bottom 50 countries in Reporters Sans Frontiers’ 
“Press Freedom Index.”  40% of the bottom 50 countries in the Transparency 
International’s “Corruption Perception Index” are from the region.  The Fund For Peace’s 
“Failed States Index” is a “1 to 10” scale of stability, with “10 being the most at-risk of 
collapse and violence;” in Sub-Saharan Africa, 36 countries are ranked as 8 or worse.  
And, of the 52 countries in the world that the Economist Intelligence Unit ranks as 
“authoritarian,” 23 of them can be found there.6 
But what if there is another level to the story about conditions in Africa?  What if 
what has transpired thus far is a cycle of bad news begetting bad news, and that the above 
views only perpetuate further negative outcomes?   If this is the case, then it may be 
possible to find positive performance indicators using different, non-traditional means to 
get a more holistic assessment, and begin the opposite cycle.  After all, if conventional 
assessments, perceptions, and approaches have facilitated negative outcomes, then it may 
follow that alternative assessments, perceptions, and approaches may facilitate more 
positive outcomes.  The challenge in Africa is to first seek out and validate those positive 
indicators, and then decide how the US can best engage a country once armed with that 
information. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index,” http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-
2012,1043.html.  Fund For Peace, “Failed States Index,” 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi.  Transparency International, “Corruption Perception 
Index,” http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/.  Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index,” 
http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf.  All accessed April 22, 2012). 
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The literature is sharply divided over the linkages between regime type and 
development and capacity building.  Collier finds that 
any difference between the average performance of democracies and that 
of autocracies is dwarfed by the difference in the dispersion of 
performance among autocracies [such as military, single-party, or 
personalist regimes]: they can be both much worse and much better 
performance than democracies.”7   
 
And Przeworski and Limongi find no correlation between regime type and development.8 
In support of this paper’s central idea, Olson writes that the state is a “stationary 
bandit,” incentivized to ensure its survival by providing for the common good of its 
people, who in turn appreciate the order the state provides.9  Elbadawi and Sambanis note 
that both democracies and autocracies can be less prone to civil wars than anocracies, 
though “deeper democracies may be better able to handle regime transitions than 
midlevel regimes or autocracies”10 (Fjende further stratifies by saying “military regimes 
and multi-party electoral autocracies run a higher risk of conflict than single-party 
authoritarian regimes”11).  And Persson and Tabellini find that “countries liberalizing 
their economy before extending political rights do better than those carrying out the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Paul Collier, “The Political Economy of Fragile States and Implications for European 
Development Policy,” Oxford University Department of Economics (May 2009), 7-8. 
8 Adam Przeworkski and Fernando Limongi, 1993. “Political Regimes and Economic Growth,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (3): 51-69. 
9 In the same paper, he argues that a democracy is better for development.  For more, see Mancur 
Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” American Political Science Review 87 
(September 1993): 567-576. 
10 Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, “How Much War Will We See? Explaining the 
Prevalence of Civil War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Jun., 2002), 311. 
11 Hanne Fjende, “Generals, Dictators, and Kings: Authoritarian Regimes and Civil Conflict, 
1973!2004,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 27, no. 195: 215. 
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opposite sequence,” a conclusion that seems to be borne out by the history of China since 
the late 1970s and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.12 
However, other literature on various forms of autocracy—such as a benevolent or 
soft dictatorship, or façade democracy—and their associated elites do not paint a positive 
picture of the development and capacity-building outcomes they facilitate in such areas as 
public administration, international diplomacy, justice and citizen well being, and the 
establishment of rule-of-law.  Chebal finds “authoritarian (or ‘evil’) elites...profoundly 
unfavorable to the prospect of development and that, as a result, the economic situation of 
most African countries continues to worsen.”13  Larsson and Parente found that elites in 
autocracies enact policies that can retard development (though they also found that 
democracies are “inherently susceptible to the erection of barriers that retard 
development).14  Finally, Bates argues that, while elites can provide for public good in 
the long term, the limited governance infrastructure present in Sub-Saharan Africa after 
independence of the 1960s “shortened the time horizons of politicians and lessened their 
incentives to act for the public good.”15   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, “Democracy and Development: The Devil in the 
Details,” NBER Working Paper No. 11993, Issued in February 2006, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11993 (accessed October 30, 2012). 
13 Patrick Chebal, “The Quest for Good Government and Development in Africa: Is NEPAD the 
Answer?”  International Affairs 78, no. 3 (2002), 461. 
14 Anna Larsson and Stephen Parente, “Democracy as a Middle Ground: A United Theory of 
Development and Political Regimes,” Stockholm University (May 2009), 25 and 5. 
15 Nicholas VanDeWalle, “Review of When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century 
Africa,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2008), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64433/nicholas-van-de-walle/when-things-fell-apart-state-
failure-in-late-century-africa (accessed October 30, 2012).  For more see Robert Bates, When 
Thigns Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa (Cambridge: University Press, 2008). 
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This thesis assumes that the US—particularly in a post-conflict environment—
will not always have the privilege of engaging a country with the government that it 
wants, but rather will find itself engaging the government that the country has.  As such, 
knowing the most effective way to engage an existing system—autocratic warts and all—
has obvious benefits. 
This thesis will propose non-traditional methods of assessment, albeit using 
traditional methodologies, in order to get a more holistic picture of different countries and 
regions in Africa.  Because of the various metrics included here, this thesis will include 
anthropological, political science, and socio-economic perspectives, and will look at the 
broad themes of military engagement, state capacity building, and resultant stability.  It 
will also involve the domains of military affairs, human rights, and development.  It will 
not, however, be primarily hypothetical, or based on a single theory: It will be issue-
driven throughout.  This paper limits itself to only looking at US responses to the 
information presented, and policy decisions regarding the findings; it does not consider 
multi-national approaches, nor does it factor the role that other nations—particularly 
China—would play when crafting an engagement plan.   
This thesis will argue that it may be possible to identify new ways for researchers 
to assess authoritarian elites in Africa, in order to identify areas that hold promise and so 
these outcomes can then be used to drive improvements to more traditional indicators.  
However, the findings of each chapter are only part of the overall approach espoused 
here: that the US can and should take a holistic view of a country and region before 
deciding the best way to intervene and interact with that country militarily.  
! 7!
For hundreds of years, outsiders have seen the continent as backwards, lacking the 
will, the discipline, or the intelligence to develop at the same rate and to the same level as 
their Western counterparts.  But if researchers can discover alternate means of assessing 
countries in Africa, it may be possible to create a more positive narrative from which 
more positive outcomes may originate.   
A Note on Organization 
This thesis is divided into two distinct parts: The first, “Through A New Lens,” 
proposes unconventional metrics by which researchers may assess the state of countries 
in Africa.  It will look at the possibility of positive outcomes via benevolent dictatorships, 
as well as how a countries can leverage lesser-known natural resources as a spring board 
to fuel more success.   
The second part, “So What?  Moving Forward with New Insights,” examines how 
the US military can engage authoritarian states and their elites given this knowledge, so 
that they can facilitate more positive outcomes.  This includes a study of attempts to 
leverage military assistance to shape outcomes in repressive countries, and a final chapter 
that makes several programmatic recommendations for military planners about how to 
proceed in crafting a military engagement plan with African nations.   
It was written not only as an explanatory summary, but also to make 
programmatic and policy recommendations, with an eye towards affecting future 
engagement and outcomes. 
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CHAPTER TWO: RWANDA—NEGATIVE GOVERNMENT, POSITIVE 
OUTCOMES? 
Introduction 
In Africa, nearly 80% of the countries are run by authoritarian governments of 
varying degrees.1 And while a strongman in a situation like this can use his consolidated 
power to institute a top-down program of repression, in theory, it can also make it easier 
to implement more positive changes.  Thus, any study into the potential for positive 
outcomes in African countries can greatly benefit from starting at the top.  And few 
places in Africa have shown the benefits of a strong hand at the top like Rwanda.   
For a visitor to Rwanda, there is a stark distinction when compared with other 
African countries such as Sierra Leone, Lesotho, or even neighboring ones such as 
Uganda.  The streets are cleaner, houses are painted and yards tended, and there are fewer 
of the 10-foot, broken-glass-topped security walls so emblematic of Sub-Saharan Africa.  
When I visited in January 2011, there were still street hawkers, to be sure; the difference 
was that in Kigali, instead of selling air fresheners for cars, they were selling copies of 
The Economist.  Less anecdotally, the government in Kigali has overseen some of 
Africa’s most impressive growth since the end of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994.  This is 
especially impressive considering key two factors.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat,” 9, 
http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf (September 28, 2012)!
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First, the turmoil and ethnic strife that were in place when the Paul Kagame 
regime took power after the 4-year Civil War and 1994 Genocide, in which 800,000 to 1 
million people, mostly Tutsis and moderate Hutus, were murdered in the span of around 
100 days.  And second, the domestic turmoil and regional conflicts that seem to plague 
other African nations.  As The Economist noted in August 2010, “Its GDP has doubled, 
albeit to a tiny $5 billion, since 2005. Most Rwandans have medical insurance. Tax 
revenue may rise by 12% this year and GDP is expected to go up by 6%”.  Foreign aid 
(as a percentage of GDP) has dropped from nearly 100% in 1994 to 50% today; “Mr. 
Kagame wants to see it fall to 30% by 2017.”2  (Some of the foreign aid given after the 
end of the Genocide is no doubt tied to Western guilt over their lack of intervention.  But 
it is important to remember that foreign aid did provide an economic springboard for the 
government in Kigali to jumpstart the economy, while ensuring that foreign aid was 
viewed as only a temporary fix and not a long-term solution). 
If Rwanda does indeed “work,” and this condition is considered desirable for a 
nation, especially in a post-conflict setting as horrific as it was after the Civil War and 
Genocide that resulted in several million killed, wounded, maimed, and displaced, several 
questions need to be addressed.  The most important one, and the one that this chapter 
seeks to answer, is: does Rwanda indeed “work,” and has the regime of Paul Kagame 
provided stability and security for Rwandans, and improved their welfare, since the end 
of the Civil War and Genocide in 1994?  Compared with most other African countries, 
Rwanda appears to be more stable, secure, and prosperous, but this really the case?  Are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 “President Paul Kagame Under Scrutiny,” The Economist, August 5, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com /node/16750119 (accessed October 23, 2011). 
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these true indicators of recovery and success, so atypical in post-conflict settings in 
general, and in African nations in particular?  Or are these simply window dressing, 
masking residual feelings of animosity that could flare up and shatter an illusion that the 
administration in Kigali has carefully built?  Finally, how could knowing more about a 
perceived benevolent dictator allow the US Government to prevent the occurrence of, or 
mitigate the tragedies associated with, a civil war, if there are indicators that the ends (a 
stable nation, decreased violence, and improved welfare) will justify the means (the 
conduct of the war, the potential for limited civil freedoms, and possible human rights 
abuses)? 
This chapter will conclude that the benevolent dictatorship of Paul Kagame has 
been a positive framework for post-civil war governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, even if it 
is not truly benevolent.  While there are definite shortcomings when it comes to human 
rights and civil liberties, it is Kagame’s focusing on the essentials of security and 
stability—even if improvements to welfare continue to lag—that have allowed Rwanda 
to make the undeniable gains that it has.  Finally, I will explain how the US Government 
supporting one side in a conflict, despite potential civil and human rights abuses, can 
possibly prevent a civil war, or at least limit the tragedies associated with it. 
Challenges and Limitations 
There are aspects of the Rwanda question that this chapter does not seek to 
address, but that would indisputably contribute to a better understanding of the dynamic 
there.  For one thing, this chapter does not seek to analyze Rwanda’s actions outside its 
own borders: It is possible, even probable, that in the wake of Kagame taking power, the 
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mass emigration of Hutus—guilty and innocent alike—allowed Rwanda to succeed by 
exporting its problems and problem citizens, and that there is still ethnic tension.3  The 
ongoing conflict on the Rwanda-Congo border alone would appear to support this.   
Similarly, I do not address Kagame’s impact on the region, or pretend that it has 
been as positive as it has been domestically.  There is ample evidence that Kagame’s 
deployment of Rwandan troops to intervene in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
make him responsible for some of the same brutality as the Interahamwe, though clearly 
not the same scale.  A United Nations (UN) report released in 2006 documented  
over 600 major crimes including mass rape, targeted killings of civilians 
and other crimes against humanity from 1993 to 2003. The report 
implicates armed forces from Uganda and Rwanda in many of the crimes, 
suggesting that some may have amounted to genocide.4 
   
Data Availability 
 With regards to the limits of this research chapter itself and the information 
available, it can be difficult to find records from before the Civil War and Genocide as 
the Hutu regime sometimes destroyed the records.  In Conspiracy to Murder, Linda 
Melverne notes,  
Most of Rwanda’s arms deals were negotiated through the Rwandan 
embassy in Paris…When the Genocide was over, extensive records were 
found in the Embassy offices, but not one of them concerned Rwanda’s 
relationship with France.  All the documents related to this crucial aspect 
of the Genocide had been destroyed by Colonel Sebastien Ntahobari 
(Rwanda’s military attaché in France).5   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Professor Guy Burgess, corrections to draft in e-mail message to author, October 29, 2011. 
4 Michael Onyiego, “UN Congo Report Released Amid Protests from Uganda, Rwanda,” Voice 
Of America, October 1, 2010, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/UN-Congo-Report-
Released-Amid-Protest-from-Uganda-Rwanda-104165814.html (accessed November 6, 2011). 
5 Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder (London: Verso, 2004), 57. 
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Another potential barrier to information gathering is rooted in Kigali’s policy 
prohibiting ubwoko, or tribal affiliation, in order to build a sense of “Rwandaness” after 
the conflict.6  Consequently, ethnicity is extremely taboo and it is quite difficult to talk to 
Rwandans about their tribal affiliation.  One newly arrived US Embassy employee, after 
asking a Rwandan about his tribal affiliation at a party, was declared persona non grata 
by the government in Kigali and departed Rwanda less than a week after he arrived.7 
These laws, addressed in greater detail below, amount to censorship that prevents free 
discourse about the direction of the country or the government.  When using data from 
surveys or interviews, this must be taken into account as Rwandans might alter their true 
answer or mask their true feelings. 
Government-Provided Data 
There is always the problem of government-provided data.  In Rwanda, as 
elsewhere, there is truth to the idea that, “history is written by the victors.”  The Kagame 
regime has gone to great pains to portray Rwanda as a success story, which has benefitted 
the country.  As such, there is no motivation to provide data that would convey a negative 
image or scare investors away.  However, some researchers might not want to avoid these 
subjective evaluations, as much can be learned by peoples’ attitudes and the manner in 
which government data is presented, as long as it is properly vetted against more 
objective data. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 US Department of State, “Background Note: Rwanda (Government and Political Conditions),” 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm#political (accessed October 29, 2011). 
7 W. Stuart Symington (US Ambassador to Rwanda), in discussion with author, January 24, 2011. 
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Outliers 
Finally, researchers must identify outliers that could account for Rwanda’s post-
conflict success.  Undoubtedly, some of the praise, and accompanying aid, heaped upon 
Rwanda by the West since the Genocide comes from a guilt-ridden Western world as a 
way to quell its conscience.  Assessments of Rwanda are also made in relation to other 
African nations, some of which are perpetually in a state of chaos and anarchy. 
Mitigations 
One way to mitigate many of the problems listed here is to analyze documents, 
books, papers, and studies authored by Rwandans themselves.  However, as already 
mentioned, Rwanda limits free speech under the umbrella of preventing “genocide 
ideology” and “sectarianism,”8 a broadly-applied law widely criticized in the 
international community as a tool of political repression and a means of silencing 
legitimate critics of the government.  As British ex-pat Graham Holiday wrote in his 
“Kigali Wire” blog, “The blogging community, such that it is, consists mainly of expats 
blogging.  Most of those appear to be transient, they'll often only be here for a year or so 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Stephen Kinzer, “The Limits of Free Speech in Rwanda,” The Guardian, March 2, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/mar/02/rwanda-free-speech-
genocide (accessed November 2, 2011). 
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and then they're gone.  So, there's little to no effect.  Its rare to find bloggers within 
Rwanda blogging on these issues (of censorship).”9   
Indeed, research I have conducted thus far has not identified a significant body of 
Rwandan authors, writers, or bloggers; none of the stature of better-known African 
writers such as Nigeria’s Chinua Achebe (Things Fall Apart), Lesotho’s Thomas Mofolo 
(Chaka), or South Africa’s Alan Paton (Cry, The Beloved Country); and certainly none 
critical of the government.  A researcher’s true understanding of Rwanda is therefore 
limited by this dearth of first-hand resources; further study or carefully-conducted 
research could mitigate this problem in future studies. 
A Recent History of Rwanda 
Although it is easy to identify when Rwandan rebel forces crossed the Ugandan-
Rwandan border, it is difficult to pin down the spark that ignited the Rwandan Civil War 
between the two main ethic groups.  Tribal tension existed for years, with struggles 
resulting in power passing back and forth between Hutus and the Tutsis long before the 
Germans (and later the Belgians) claimed Rwanda as one of their colonies during the 
“Scramble for Africa” in the late 1800s.  Surely the Belgians codifying their support for 
“the disenfranchisement of the Hutus and the reinforcement of ‘the traditional hegemony 
of well-born Tutsis’ ” in the 1930s did not help.10  The Hutus, with a majority of the 
population, eventually formed the Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Etienne Mashuli, “Blogging from Within Rwanda: A Conversation with Graham Holiday,” 
February 16, 2011, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/02/16/rwanda-blogging-from-inside-
rwanda-a-conversation-with-graham-holiday/ (accessed November 2, 2011). 
10 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our 
Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York: Picador, 1998), 56. 
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(Parmehutu), taking power after overthrowing the Tutsi-run government in November 
1959, and Gregoire Kayibanda eventually won a UN-supervised election less than two 
years later.  However, rampant corruption in his administration resulted in a military coup 
d’état in July 1973, and Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, a fellow Hutu, took 
power.11  
Shortly afterwards, as a result of the violent overthrow and increasingly repressive 
policies of the Belgian-administrated and Hutu-led Habyarimana government, around 
130,000 Rwandan Tutsis fled to neighboring countries.12  Although initially tolerated 
most places, these refugees soon made up a majority of the population in many areas, 
increasing tension over food, land, employment, and other limited resources.  Eventually, 
a combination of host government xenophobia towards Tutsis, increasing Western 
pressure for democracy in Africa, and a longing for “the way it used to be” by the 
Diaspora (by 1991 numbering almost 400,000), resulted in some Tutsi clamoring for a 
return, by any means, to Rwanda.13   
It was from these refugees that General Fred Rwigyema formed the 4,000-man 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that invaded Rwanda on 1 October 1990, officially 
starting the Rwandan Civil War14.  After three years of brutal fighting, and no lack of war 
crimes or human rights violations on either side, both parties met at Arusha, Tanzania in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Global Security, “Rwanda Civil War,” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/rwanda.htm (accessed October 19, 2011). 
12 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 160. 
13 Ibid, 530. 
14 Ibid, 491. 
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1993, eventually signing a power-sharing agreement.  However, further massacres of 
Tutsi prompted the RPF to recommence their attacks, eventually putting more pressure 
on the Hutu-regime.   
Tension came to a boiling point when President Habyarimana’s plane was shot 
down on 6 April 1994, sparking the genocide.15  RPF forces once again went on the 
offensive, eventually taking Kigali; Paul Kagame, until then the military leader of the 
Tutsi-dominated RPF, took charge. However, Hutu militias (referred to as Interahamwe, 
literally “those who work together”16) fearing punishment and Hutu tribal members 
fearing retribution, fled the country in droves, eventually numbering two million and 
settling largely in the Great Lakes region, notably Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of 
Congo).  Standing up a government-in-exile, they began a campaign to destabilize the 
Tutsi-dominated government, basing their operations out of the refugee camps and 
employing recently emigrated Hutu.  Of the refugees crossing into Zaire, the UN Force 
Commander at the time, Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, writes in his book Shake 
Hands with the Devil that 
The Zairians were finally disarming the RGF (Rwandese Government Forces, 
mainly Hutus at that time) at the border, stripping some of them of items such 
as machetes and rifles, but large weapons—artillery, heavy mortars, anti-
aircraft guns and anti-tank systems—were being waved through and escorted 
north of the city.  Neither the Zairians nor the French were taking any 
measures to separate the militias, gendarmes or soldiers from the civilians as 
they crossed the border.17 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Ibid, 507. 
16 Gourevitch, 93. !
17 Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil (Toronto: Vintage, 2003), 471. 
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It was a situation that would hardly facilitate regional stability. 
As a result of the attacks inside Rwanda that followed, President Kagame decided 
to send RPF forces into Zaire to counter the treat posed by the Hutus, beginning a series 
of conflicts subsequently dubbed “First Congo War” and “Second Congo War.”  The 
latter, eventually involving nine African nations and resulting in the death of 5.4 million 
people, is referred to without hyperbole as “Africa’s World War.”18  Echoes of it are 
still felt in the region today. 
The Bottom Line: Does Rwanda Work? 
In order to properly decide if Rwanda works, it is necessary to decide what it 
means for a country to “work.”  It cannot be merely stability, for totalitarian regimes can 
provide stability while citizens live in fear.  It cannot be purely security, as a brutal 
military can be a tool of a one-party democracy.  For the purposes of this chapter, I will 
define a country as “working” by evaluating the most common metrics used by various 
Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs), think tanks, government agencies, non-profits, 
etc.  Because of the focus that Rwanda has gotten as a result of the Genocide and the 
stability and rebuilding that followed, there exists copious amounts of data (quantifiable, 
qualifiable, and anecdotal) on which to base an assessment of Rwanda’s status today.   
It is important to note that in most cases, the connection between the indicators 
below and measuring if a country “works” or not, is a corollary relationship, and not a 
causal one.  In other words, seeing a country increase its educational expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP, or witnessing very few coup d’états, does not cause a country to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 “Violence Against Women: War’s Overlooked Victims,” The Economist, January 13, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/17900482 (accessed October 23, 2011). 
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work; it could simply mean a tyrant is spending more money, or effectively using his 
security apparatus to quell any chance of a coup.  But rather, there is a correlation, a link, 
between a country that “works” and one that seeing the indicators listed below. 
 
Stability 
“Stability” means there is as a continuity of governance at all levels, with little 
“likelihood that the established government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.”19  Put 
more simply, there will be no “unscheduled” changes of government, and that when it is 
time for a ruling party to depart, as dictated by elections, constitutional mandate, or other 
means, they will do so. 
Continuity of Government 
While continuity of government could be seen as an indicator of stability, in 
studying Africa one must delineate between “continuity of government” and “continuity 
of leadership.”  A dictator who refuses to leave office might be providing a type of 
continuity, but this certainly does not indicate the kind of “political stability” we 
associate with, for example, 43 peaceful transitions of power in the United States. 
Number of Coup d’État Attempts 
Since President Kagame assumed power in 1993 (via coup d’état, ironically) there 
have been only two unsuccessful coup attempts (December 2008 and April 2010) 
(Rwandaonline 2009, and Rwandarwabanyarwanda 2010), which is fairly insignificant.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 World Bank, “Political Violence,” http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/pv.pdf 
(accessed October 23, 2011). 
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This is especially true compared with other African nations in that same period of time, 
for which coups—both attempted and successful—have been a way of life: Chad, 
Lesotho, and Nigeria have had 4 attempted or successful coups d’état.  Code d’Ivoire, 
Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zimbabwe have had 5; The Gambia and Guinea have had 6; 
Mauritania and Niger 7; and Equatorial-Guinea an astounding 1120.  For Rwanda, this 
may indicate satisfaction with the administration, though more likely, as an effective 
security apparatus. 
Invasions 
There have been no invasions since General Paul Kagame invaded (or “returned 
to liberate,” depending on your take) Rwanda in 1990. 
Insurgencies 
There is an on-going fight in DRC and North-west Rwanda, directly related to the 
emigration of Hutus after Kagame’s RPF took charge in 1993.  Many Interahamwe 
understandably feared retribution by the Tutsis because of the Genocide and fled to 
neighboring Zaire (now the DRC).  It is unlikely that those Hutus in command, made up 
largely of Hutus facing the most serious charges in connection with the Genocide, will 
give up either their fight or their units, and the conflict will continue for the predictable 
future, though without tangible threat to the regime. 
Terrorist Acts Aimed at Overthrowing the Government 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Monty and Donna Marshall, “Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946-2010: A Macro-Comparative 
Perspective,” Center for Systemic Peace, June 15, 2011, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/africa/ACPPAnnex2b.pdf (accessed August 27, 2012). 
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There are occasionally individual grenade attacks (the least committal in terms of 
conducting an attack), most in Kigali and frequently cited as examples of Hutus 
continuing to target Tutsis, or extremists from both sides trying destabilize the Kagame 
administration.  But aside from the Northwest region, there has been no large-scale 
fighting inside Rwanda region since 1994. 
 
Security 
“Security” means having limited threats, both domestically and externally, to 
Rwandan citizens’ physical welfare (the most important immediate need for Rwandans—
or anyone in these circumstances—in the wake of the Civil War and Genocide).  While 
they sound similar, “stability” addresses attempts at destabilizing or overthrowing the 
government, while “security” addresses various attempts targeting the people of that 
country. 
Crime Rates and Patterns 
The US State Department lists Rwanda’s crime rates as “medium,” and warns, 
“Attempted home robberies, automobile break-ins, pick-pocketing, purse snatchings, and 
theft of vehicle accessories in Kigali do occur, but most crimes committed in Rwanda are 
non-violent.”  They go on to state that drugs are not a problem, there is little evidence of 
scams, and notably for Africa, there are no “off limits” areas.21  Of the 15 Africa 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 US Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, “Rwanda 2011 OSAC Crime and 
Safety Report,” April 30, 2011, https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportPDF.aspx?cid=10933 
(accessed 20 October 2011). 
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countries I visited in 2010-2011, Rwanda felt by far the safest, possibly because of 
greater economic opportunity precluding the need to turn to a life of crime. 
Numbers of Political Prisoners and Politically Motivated Executions 
Although Rwanda initially used the death penalty to punish perpetrators of the 
Genocide, the government outlawed the death penalty in 2007.22  There remain 
miscellaneous reports of illegal detentions, holding of political prisoners without charge, 
and other abuses, though it does not appear to be widespread. 
Limited Threats to Physical Welfare 
And according to the Rwandan Judicial Police, since 2005, “cases of murder have 
gone down 36%, rape and defilement 34%, and robbery 4.7%.”23  These improvements, 
as with “Crime Rates and Patterns” above, may be related to improved economic 
conditions benefitting the average Rwandan. 
Incidents of Inter-Ethnic Violence 
As mentioned in the above section on “terrorist acts,” there are extreme and 
irreconcilable members of both Hutu (and Tutsi, it should be noted) factions who 
continue to target moderates and members of the opposition.  Not widespread because of 
an effective security apparatus, it undoubtedly combines with relatively recent memories 
of the Genocide to cause fear in the minds of everyday Rwandans.    
Improved Welfare !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Amnesty International, “Rwanda Abolishes Death Penalty,” October 29, 2007, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/good-news/rwanda-abolishes-death-penalty-
20070802 (accessed October 20, 2011). 
23 Bosco Asiimwe, “Rwanda: Crime Rate Goes Down—Police,” All Africa, December 14, 2010, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201012140645.html (accessed 20 October 2011). 
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Initially less pressing than security concerns, but as important or perhaps more so 
in the long run, “improved welfare” is defined by all the other issues a nation needs to 
address for its people to believe that things are getting better.  This includes the metrics 
that can be hardest to measure (improvements to education and health, expanding 
freedom of press), but that conceptually capture if life is improving. 
 
 
Food Security 
According to the Economist, Kagame counts providing food for all Rwandans as 
his greatest achievement: 
“For the first time in Rwandan history we have almost 100% food 
security.” He says his government has given villagers cattle, fertilizer and 
better seed. He reels off a list of crops that, he claims, have had record 
harvests: cassava, maize, rice, sorghum, sweet potatoes and wheat. “We’re 
selling food to Burundi, Tanzania and Congo.”24  
 
Health 
The government in Kigali has doubled health expenditures during Kagame’s reign 
(from 4.5% of GDP in 1994, to 9% today), and this improved focus on health has resulted 
in lower crude birth rates (from 24 per 1000 in 1993, to 19.7 in 2009) and infant mortality 
rates (from 135.7 per 100,000 in 1994, to 59.1 today).  Simultaneously, life expectancy 
has increased from a low of 26.8 years in 1993 (undoubtedly still low from the Civil War 
and Genocide), to 54.7 in 2010.  Access to improved sanitation facilities has increased 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 The Economist, “President Paul Kagame Under Scrutiny,” August 5, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/ node/16750119 (accessed October 23, 2011). 
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(52.4% of the population had access in 1990, compared with 60.6% in 2009).25  HIV 
prevalence rates remain unimpressive, remaining at #25 on the continent, even if it has 
declined slightly in the last couple of years.26 
 
 
Education 
This has been a mixed bag in Rwanda.  The administration in Kigali has also 
increased expenditures slightly (from 4.3% of GDP in 1999, to 4.9% in 2009), ranking 
10th of the 35 African countries for which data was available in 1999, and 13th of the 33 
countries available in 2009.  85% of youth are enrolled in primary school, and both males 
and females (ages 15-24) have achieved a 77% literacy rate. The percent of trained 
teachers greatly improved from 48.6% in 1999 to 93.9% in 2009, but during that same 
time frame, Rwanda achieved to the second highest teacher/pupil ratio in Africa, 
dropping from 54.2 to 1 in 1999, to 68.3 to 1 in 2009.27 
Economic Security 
Per capita GDP has more than doubled under Kagame, from $4,507 in 1994 to 
$9,216 in 2010.  But poverty remains a pressing problem, with no significant change in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 The World Bank, “Data (Rwanda),” http://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda (accessed 
October 22, 2011). 
26 CIA, World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/ 
2155rank.html (accessed October 23, 2011).  
27 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “Financing Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Meeting the 
Challenges of Expansion, Equity, and Quality,” 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/Finance _EN_web.pdf  (accessed October 20, 
2011). 
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the past 5 years to the 58.5% of the population living below the poverty line; 89% of 
people are living below $2/day, and 76% living on $1.25/day.28  Recognizing this, 
Kagame published his “Vision 2020,” with ambitious but realistic goals for the country.  
This economic project plans to 
boost GDP sevenfold, find paying jobs for half of Rwanda's subsistence 
farmers, nearly quadruple per capita income to $900, and turn his country 
into an African center for technology, all by 2020. The government is 
doing what it can—it has, for instance, committed to investing annually 
5% of its GDP in science and technology by 2012—but to reach those 
goals, it's going to need outside assistance.29 
  
As a way to get this outside assistance to fund continued growth without 
accepting more aid, President Kagame is actively trying to attract foreign investors, and 
his efforts have paid off: The World Bank rated Rwanda “world's top reformer” in their 
2011 Doing Business report, saying, “Rwanda is the easiest place to do business in East 
Africa and the fourth best in Africa.”30  Kagame should also be commended for avoiding 
the “aid mentality” so prevalent in Africa; his approach was clearly reflected in the 
attitude and work ethic of the Rwandans I met. 
Freedom of the Press 
Ranking #107 in Reporters sans Frontières’ (RSF) 2002 “Press Freedom Index,” 
Rwanda dropped almost 60 places to #169 out of 178 in 2010.  RSF stated that, “Rwanda, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 The World Bank, “Data (Rwanda),” http://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda (accessed 
October 20, 2011).  
29 Jeff Chu, “Rwanda Rising: A New Model of Economic Development,” April 1, 2009, Fast 
Company, http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/134/special-report-rwanda-rising.html 
(accessed October 19, 2011). 
30 “Rwanda: Best Place to do Business,” All Africa, October 21, 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/ 
201110210694.html (accessed October 20, 2011). 
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Yemen and Syria have joined Burma and North Korea in the group of the world’s most 
repressive countries towards journalists.”31  Amnesty International’s 2011 report notes 
that, “The government used regulatory sanctions, restrictive laws and criminal 
defamation cases to close down media outlets critical of the government…Some leading 
editors and journalists fled the country after facing threats and harassment”.32 
Freedom of Expression 
In the same report, Amnesty International reported, “A clampdown on freedom of 
expression and association before August [2010] presidential elections prevented new 
opposition parties from fielding candidates.”  They continue, “The authorities continued 
to misuse broad and ill-defined laws on ‘genocide ideology’ and ‘sectarianism’. The laws 
prohibit hate speech, but also criminalize legitimate criticism of the government.”33   
Free and Fair Elections 
 “Labeled a staunch economic reformer by Western governments, but also called a 
ruthless dictator by his opponents and by human rights groups,” the Christian Science 
Monitor wrote in August 2010, “Mr. Kagame is widely expected to win by a landslide, at 
least in part because several of his opponents have been forbidden from participating and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index 2010,” 
http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement& id_rubrique=1034 (accessed October 14, 2011). 
32 Amnesty International, “Country Report: Rwanda,” 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/rwanda/report-2011 (accessed October 14, 2011). 
33 Ibid. 
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others have been killed in what rights groups and analysts suspect were assassinations.”34  
He ended up winning 93% of the vote.35 However, given how fractured the Rwandan 
political process has been in the past, Phil Clark proposed in the UK’s “Guardian” that 
while the Tutsi-dominated RPF is hardly loved in the countryside, many 
Hutu (who constitute around 85% of the population) view a vote for 
Kagame as a vote for continuing peace and stability—no mean 
achievement after years of violence. The whole stability of the country 
therefore depends on Kagame maintaining his status, and so repressive 
political acts can be an integral part of Rwandan progress.  To maintain 
cohesion in a divided party, Kagame has struck out against relatively 
unthreatening targets as a show of strength.36   
 
Perhaps the Hutu fear the renewed retribution of a divided but hard-liner dominated RPF 
more than the repressive policies of a united but stable Kagame administration. 
Corruption 
In its 2010 “Corruption Perception Index,” Transparency International gave 
Rwanda a score of 4.1; this certainly doesn’t put it on par with Sweden or Switzerland, 
but it is the 5th best score in all of Sub-Saharan Africa.37 
Conclusion 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Max Delaney, “How a Kagame Win in Rwanda Election Could Destabilize Region,” Christian 
Science Monitor, August 9, 2010 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0809/How-a-
Kagame-win-in-Rwanda-election-could-destabilize-region (accessed October 15, 2010). 
35 “Rwanda President Kagame Wins Election with 93% of Vote,” BBC, August 11, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10935892 (accessed October 5, 2011). 
36 Phil Clark, “Rwanda: Kagame’s Power Struggle,” The Guardian, August 5, 2010, 
http://www.guardian. co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/aug/05/rwanda-kagames-power-
struggle (accessed October 18, 2011). 
37 Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index 2010,” http://www.transparency.org 
/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (accessed October 19, 2011). 
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Human Rights Watch (HRW) questions Kigali’s approach of accepting 
“economic development first, human rights later" by asking, “Would we be prepared to 
sacrifice our right to free speech or political participation for the sake of ‘reasonably 
equitable development’ or subjective ‘political stability’?”38  Despite this valid question, 
the majority of the metrics used to measure stability and security in Rwanda show a 
positive trend.  While there are undoubtedly gains to be made with regards to improved 
welfare, in particular more civil liberties and human rights, these are not the things that 
people in a post-conflict setting initially need the most.  Where it gets tricky, however, is 
in determining when “enough” time has elapsed, and when a country is “ready” for the 
more liberal aspects of “improved welfare”: Freedom of the press, a true multi-party 
democracy, the ability to criticize the government without fear of retribution, the right to 
a fair trial, and others.   
There is a threshold past which people who have grown used to only having their 
basic needs met begin to demand the greater freedoms which Kagame increasingly 
restricts.  It is past this brink that a regime’s tolerance of opposition will be truly tested, 
as we have seen during the Arab Spring.  Given that 70% of Rwanda’s population will 
have been born after the Genocide by 202039, this point may be reached sooner than the 
current administration hopes: the next presidential election will be in 2017. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Carina Tertsakian, “Murder or Imprisonment—A High Price for ‘Stability’ in Rwanda,” 
Human Rights Watch, June 15, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/15/murder-or-
imprisonment-high-price-stability-rwanda (accessed October 15, 2011). 
39 Josh Ruxin, “16 Years after the Genocide, Rwanda Continues Forward,” NY Times, April 6, 
2010, http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/16-years-after-the-genocide-rwanda-
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Immediately following a brutal conflict like the Rwandan Civil War and 
Genocide, a “benevolent dictatorship” is more beneficial, and more stable in the long run, 
than a pure, Western-style democracy with regards to establishing citizens’ basic rights.  
Rwanda under the current regime may never be a true democracy, though Kagame 
certainly doesn’t seem to apologize for this.  It may not even an African version of it, 
with election returns for the four-term incumbent giving him 99% of the vote.  But given 
Rwanda’s post-conflict success, Jack Chapman in “Think Africa Press” puts it succinctly:  
Kagame rules Rwanda with a strong centralized government, 
uncompromising in its management of the economy and willing to violate 
human rights…(But) human rights violations are a small price to pay for 
Rwanda’s remarkable progress.  Kagame is a dictator. But as long as he 
maintains stability and delivers reasonably equitable development, he is 
the sort of dictator Rwanda needs.40 
 
Other African nations, given the basic level of development of most, might be 
able to benefit from the same kind of dictatorship. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Jack Chapman, “Kagame—A Benign Dictator?” Think Africa Press, June 9, 2011, 
http://thinkafricapress.com/rwanda/kagame-benign-dictator (accessed October 17, 2011). 
!! 29!
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA—EXAMINING 
AUTOCRACIES 
Introduction 
Like Rwanda, leaders in both Ethiopia and Somalia have exhibited some of the 
traits common to dictators in any part of the world.  However, while the previous chapter 
dealt with if a benevolent dictator is possible, this chapter deals with the process by 
which dictatorships facilitate positive outcomes, before measuring how they well they 
provide for their people.  Rwanda established that a benevolent dictatorship can provide 
for security and stability but not improved welfare; this chapter focuses more broadly on 
basic needs (such as education, health, and economic security) and basic freedoms 
(freedom of speech, stability/security, and the perception of honest government).  It will 
conclude that because of numerous factors and conditions, few countries have the 
potential to benefit from an effective benevolent dictatorship as much as Ethiopia.  And, 
because of the chaotic situation in which Somalia finds itself, if a modicum of stability is 
ever achieved, it may only be a benevolent dictator who will be able to hold the country 
together.   
Challenges and Limitations 
One of the most obvious challenges is the availability of data: few despots would 
keep records that show negative information, and few administrators would record 
information exposing “the emperor’s new clothes.”  In any dictatorship, there is the 
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problem of access to the information, whether because it is not made public, or because 
the public does not want to speak about it.  In Ethiopia, reporters, activists, and regular 
citizens have been arrested for criticizing the government;1 in Somalia, both Islamic 
fundamentalists and government forces have targeted critics for speaking out.2 
In Somalia, the chaos that reigned there following the overthrow of Siad Barre in 
1991 means that there are precious few data available to researchers; the same can be said 
of Ethiopia during the last decade of Mengistu’s rule, however Ethiopia has an 
institutional history of bureaucracy and efficiency; Indeed, “Efficiency was a national 
trait.”3  This means that, for the diligent researcher, records may be available, though they 
might not be made available. 
Ethiopia 
“The Amhara suffers from no illusions about homo sapiens at his best…One may 
say that the Amhara’s view of human nature is dominated by the perception of man’s 
inherent aggressiveness and unworthiness.” 
-Donald L. Levine, Wax and Gold 
 Its six major ethnic groups made Ethiopia fertile ground for tribal manipulation, 
and Emperor Haile Selassie used it to stay in power for almost sixty years, one of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Human Rights Watch, “Development Without Freedom: How Aid Underwrites Repression in 
Ethiopia,” October 19, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia1010 
webwcover.pdf (accessed December 26, 2011), 18. 
2 Human Rights Watch, “Attacks on Humanitarian Workers and Civil Society Activists,” 
http://www.hrw.org/node/76418/section/13 (accessed December 26, 2011). 
3 Samuel D. Kaplan, Surrender or Starve: Travels in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea (New 
York: Vintage: 2003), 36. 
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longest ruling leaders in Africa.4  So when Mengistu came to power in 1974, 
consolidating it by 1977, he took the same tribal factions into consideration.  One of the 
drivers of the Derg overthrowing Selassie was the leadership role that the ruling Amhara 
ethnic group had played at the expense of other ethnic groups.  Ironically, Major Haile 
Mariam Mengistu rode to power on the tails of the radical Dergue party that “began to 
fissure along ethnic lines” soon after overthrowing Selassie.5  Kaplan explains, “The 
ethnic animosities basic to an empire of great diversity quickly became dominant.”6  
Being partly from the lower-status Oromo people instead of the Amhara who had ruled 
Ethiopia for decades, Mengistu was seen as a unifier; this image did not last long after he 
took power.7 
 One of the first things Mengistu did when taking power was to consolidate this 
power in the main cities by way of eliminating existing Selassie loyalists.  He then turned 
on some of the same people who helped get him to power, including the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement 
(MEISON in Amharic).  Hundreds were killed and thousands were jailed; “Having 
destroyed the EPRP with the help of MEISON, the Dergue was turning against MEISON 
itself.”8   At the same time, he created a new national narrative, a “variant form of 
Amharization” that “manipulated myth, tradition, and history to recast (the Dergue’s) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Kaplan, 15. 
5 The Dergue, formally known as the “Coordinating Committee of be Armed Forces, Police, and 
Territorial Army,” ruled Ethiopia with Mengistu at its head until he was deposed in 1989. 
6 Kaplan, 21. 
7 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 244. 
8 Kaplan, 25. 
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strategies in a more favorable light,”9 similar to the way Selassie had in creating the myth 
of Amhara superiority and his own status as a deity.  This storyline remained a “‘festering 
wound’ in contemporary political affairs” under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.10 
 Once secure in his position, Mengistu turned his attention to the ethnic groups that 
had been rebelling against “Abyssinian colonialism” for decades, particularly Eritreans 
and Tigrayans in the north; ironically, his effort targeting intellectuals may have 
weakened his own position and strengthened that of these opposition groups: “The 
suppression of dissent under Mengistu brought death to many educated Ethiopians and 
drove others into exile, depriving the country of a critical human resource that could have 
contributed to solving the famine problem.”11  At the same time, his “Red Terror” “drove 
intellectuals and other skilled professionals into rural regions, which in fact led to the 
bolstering of rebel forces who later overthrew Mengistu.”12 
Drought and Famine  
  Throughout history, governments have leveraged resource allocation to influence 
states, entities, or other polities, internal and external.  It can be withheld, such as when 
the US government withheld federal funding from states like Louisiana in order to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Peter VanArsdale, Forced to Flee (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 49. 
10 Ibid, 58. 
11 Raymond W. Copson, “Ethiopia: War and Famine,” http://0-web.lexis-
nexis.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/congcomp/attachment/a.pdf?_m=c996aefd6af3aa02d373ae15d05
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(accessed December 11, 2011). 
12 VanArsdale, 49. 
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pressure them to set the drinking age at 21.13   Or it can be given like Washington’s 
financial and military aid to Pakistan, which can “influence Pakistan in directions that 
provide for greater regional stability and security.”14  In much the same way, Mengistu 
used resource allocation during the droughts (not to be confused, definition-wise, with a 
famine) in the early 1980s to stay in power, repress those whom they viewed as a threat, 
and shore up support with key stakeholders.    
  Between 1900 and 2010, the 10 worst natural disasters were all droughts, several 
associated with famines, and all occurred after July 1965.15   
Like the five previous ones that had devastated Ethiopia since Haile 
Selassie assumed power in 1916, this famine took place in the north; an 
area that the Amhara emperor had a strategic interest in keeping 
underdeveloped.16 
 
Mengistu, like Selassie before him, acted in a way that facilitated a famine, one that was 
not inevitable given the amount of foreign aid that was forthcoming.  From Addis Ababa, 
he enacted Marxist policies including collectivization, villagization, and resettlement that 
exacerbated the effects of the 1983-1985 famine.  It was no coincidence that this resource 
restriction was directed towards areas where opposition groups had extensive popular 
support.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Jeffery Miron and Elina Tetlebaum, “Did the Federal Drinking Law Save Lives?”  The Cato 
Institute, Regulation (Spring 2009). 
14 http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-07/pakistan-ally-any-other-name (accessed 
17 Dec 11). 
15 United Nations Environmental Program, “Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,” 
http://www.unep.org/dewa/Portals/67/pdf/Ethiopia.pdf (accessed December 21, 2011). 
16 Kaplan, 20. 
!! 34!
 He spent $200 million celebrating the tenth anniversary of the revolution that 
brought him to power, and then told foreign countries he did not have the resources to 
purchase food.17  And at the height of the famine, when foreign donors gave more than 
1.7 metric tons of grain, it would rot on piers because Mengistu withheld Soviet-supplied 
military trucks and planes that could have transported the aid to the interior, instead 
diverting them to the resettlement effort instead;18 limited fuel supplies were also 
reallocated to other military operations and away from relief organizations.19   
  In the provinces themselves, his policies ensured misery for farmers, instituting 
grain quotas.  “In Gojjam province in 1983, nearly one-third of farmers failed to grow 
enough to meet their quotas and had to sell livestock in order to buy grain.” 
But what turned rural hardship into disaster—even before drought struck—were 
the counter-insurgency measures Mengistu’s army employed…Using scorched-
earth tactics, the army destroyed grain stores and houses, burned crops and 
pastures, killed livestock and displaced about 80,000 farmers…the army 
requisitioned food and enforced blockades of food and people. Food was routinely 
used as a weapon of war.20 
 
As a direct result of Mengistu’s policies, some 400,000 people died.21 
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  At the same time, a cunning method Mengistu used to stay in power was to keep 
the major cities well stocked with goods: 
Eritreans, Tigreans [i.e., Tigrayans], and others in the northern provinces 
died by the hundreds of thousands (while) the markets of the Amhara 
fortress of Addis Ababa were brimming with grain…it was strategically 
necessary for the regime to keep the local population pacified.22 
 
He espoused the idea of reducing the power of the long-ruling Amhara people, who had 
generally resided in the fortress towns from which they had ruled.  Ironically, as a result 
of their geographic location, they remained in a position that allowed them to benefit 
after the Selassie’s demise and to fare much better than their rural countrymen.     
  Mengistu also made sure to control information coming out of the famine-
wracked areas.  His government restricted the movement of Western aid and news 
agencies, allowing the regime to conceal evidence that could cause international 
criticism.  Aid flowed in, helping Mengistu to stay in power longer, well funded by 
Western donors who did not initially see the true drivers of the famine.    
Mengistu’s Overthrow 
  In 1991, Mengistu was overthrown by Meles Zenawi, a Tigrayan and military 
leader in the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).  One would hope that, having 
been on the receiving end of ethnic-based repression like the Tigrayans were under 
Mengistu, they would see the folly of aggravating ethnic distinctions, and avoid it in the 
future.  But similar to Rwanda where the perennially dominated Hutus exacted revenge 
on the Tutsis under whom they had lived for years, Zenawi showed signs of 
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“disproportionately favoring Tigrayan people”23 while serving as President and, until his 
August 2012 death, Prime Minister.   
  One way he did this was to sign a UN peace treaty ending the war with Eritrea 
(his mother was Eritrean) that opposition leaders in both the TPLF and the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDA) saw as unfavorable to Ethiopia; the 
most vocal opponents were jailed shortly afterwards.24  He also ensured that the top brass 
in Ethiopia’s military were predominantly Tigrayan: “The TPLF represents 6 percent of 
the Ethiopian population of 90 million. More than 90 percent of the top commanders of 
Ethiopia’s defense and security forces are represented by this minority ethnic group.”  
Additionally, he ensured that “access to wealth and wealth-making assets is dependent on 
loyalty to the government” for Tigrayan elite.25   
  The short sightedness of Zenawi’s pro-Tigrayan policies caused worry in the 
region.  Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki expressed concern with Ethiopia’s stability 
under a factionalized system such as it has.  “Ethiopia…will weaken internally as the 
Oromos and others demand more power.  Its ethnic-Tigrean president…already lives 
inside a vast security apparatus designed for his own protection.”26  In this regard, the 
similarities between Zenawi and Selassie are disturbingly similar; and unless the 
administration in Addis Ababa revises its approach to other, majority ethnicities—such as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the Oromo (who make up 35% of the population), the Amhara (26.9%), or Somali 
(6.2%)27—the minority Tigrayans could once again find themselves in the role of the 
powerless. 
Moving Ahead Today 
  Ethiopia today—though the country remains repressed, its economy 
underdeveloped, and its people subjected to restrictive government policies—is stable 
and secure, rare characteristics in Africa where coups d’état are more common than in 
any other part of the world28 (“Coup watching was not a pastime of the diplomatic circuit 
in Addis Ababa the way it was elsewhere on the continent”29).  One of the most 
disheartening things about Ethiopia today is not the high level of corruption, government 
policies that keep the population repressed, or even the violence directed towards the 
population; It is how much unrealized potential Ethiopia has.  Were the government 
willing to develop and leverage the nation’s extensive natural resources and national 
characteristics, and use the results to act more benevolently towards its population, there 
could be even more positive outcomes. 
National Consciousness 
  Ethiopia has long had a national consciousness that other African nations—
colonial creations that ignored strongly held and deeply set tribal affiliation—were 
unable to parallel.  But Selassie and Mengistu ignored this potential source of strength, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and instead relied on a culture of terror to maintain their power and position.  When 
Zenawi and his TPLF party took power, they initially instituted policies that created the 
semblance of a multi-party system: “the parties sharing power were numerous…the idea 
was that each (ethnically divided) region would actively participate, with no single region 
dominating—an ancient cause of resentment.”30  
  However, in a familiar pattern, Zenawi soon reverted to showing favoritism to the 
Tigrayans, his own ethnic group, to the exclusion of other minority ethnic groups.  It is 
by marginalizing these other groups, to the clear benefit of that of the ruling party, that 
Ethiopia will remain divided.  Zenawi could have addressed this power disparity without 
giving up his position of authority by incorporating other ethnic groups into leadership 
and ranks of the government and military.  This would also create opportunities for 
opposition parties to take part in the political process and air grievances; while opposition 
parties would not be given enough power to threaten Zenawi’s position, and not all of 
grievances would be addressed, this would be a positive step towards creating an Ethiopia 
in which more groups would feel they participate. 
Agriculture and Hydropower Development 
  Although drought and famine have wracked parts of the country for years, the 
UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) notes, “Ethiopia has great agricultural 
potential with its vast areas of fertile land, diverse climate, water resources and large 
labor pool on which to build in order to achieve national and household food security.”31  
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But in order to take advantage of this, the government must ensure that foreign aid goes 
to those most in need of it and those most able to benefit from it (as opposed to those 
most connected to the decision makers).  Another method for developing this land is to 
invite outside investors.  Recently, India and Ethiopia signed a bilateral agreement 
allowing New Delhi increase its investments in Ethiopia, already valued at $660 million.  
65% of this is in the agricultural sector, and in some areas locals account for over 99% of 
workers;32 there are obvious benefits for all parties involved.  Additionally, instead of just 
asking for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), government requests for foreign investment 
may give both investor and recipient increased buy-in, and incentivize both parties to 
seek positive outcomes to the benefit of Ethiopian citizens. 
  Ethiopia also has striking hydropower potential, as is the second largest 
hydropower potential in Africa.  Its first large dam—initially set to generate over 5000 
megawatts, but eventually able to generate over 10,000 megawatts—will improve 
Ethiopia’s position as a regional economic powerhouse.33  Complicating the project are 
opposing environmental impacts: on one hand, the project could reduce the need for 
Ethiopians to depend on dung and forest wood for energy, while the sale of electricity 
could fund other development projects in both urban and—heretofore underdeveloped—
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rural areas.  The government’s goal is to expand electricity availability to three-quarters 
of the population, an increase from the current 41% of the population.34 
  On the other hand, “environmentalists are not in favor of the ambitious 
hydropower project for its alleged impact on the hundreds of thousands of pastoralists in 
Kenya, who are dependent on Lake Turkana.”35  The lake is listed the lake as a UNESCO 
World Heritage Site in 1997 as it is the largest desert lake in the world; it is also an 
“outstanding research area for animal and plant communities.”36  Ethiopia must find a 
way to develop its hydropower potential, and to use it fairly for positive outcomes, 
without carelessly threatening the livelihood of area pastoralists, or the surrounding 
biosphere.   
National Characteristics 
  Ethiopia has a tradition of efficient and effective administration, even if it 
sometimes crossed over to bureaucracy.  Indeed, “efficiency was a national trait,” and 
during Mengistu’s time, this characteristic was used towards perverse ends:   
The efficiency of the RRC [Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, a government 
aid organization] was impressive.  But this was not due to any humanitarian 
commitment on the Dergue’s part.  In Ethiopia, administrative finesse was not 
exclusive to the RRC…Could the government of any other sub-Saharan 
country—after announcing an intention to collectivize several million people—
actually be able to do it, however crudely?37   
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  Effective and honest administration, which can indicate a trained and educated 
middle class of sorts, is necessary to realize the benefits of the agricultural and 
hydroelectric projects outlined above, including maximizing production and ensuring fair 
distribution of output.  However, it is often lacking in despotic countries that fear 
education and training could create a “thinking citizen” who could one day rise up to 
threaten a despot’s rule.  It is extremely difficult to manage the daily affairs with which 
the state is run, and the government in Addis Ababa must be willing to create this class of 
engineers and administrators, and make training and education available for all ethnic 
groups. 
  Addressing the areas above would require the leadership in Addis Ababa to 
loosen the grip on power it so tenaciously holds, incorporate other ethnic groups into both 
leadership and the ranks of the government and military, spend money on development 
projects instead of pet projects, and invest in the training and education of regular 
citizens.  But in the end, Ethiopia and Ethiopians could benefit greatly: it could create 
increased job opportunities and improved financial situation for both regular people and 
non-dominant parties, improve regional development and access to basic services for 
citizens, and actually reduce opposition strength by addressing social issues that form 
part of their platform.  Thus far it seems that the administration has not realized that by 
addressing opposition grievances, they could actually strengthen their position, power, 
and influence. 
Outcomes During Mengistu’s Rule 
  As judged by criteria implied earlier, there were a few positive outcomes to 
Mengistu’s rule, for example,  
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His cadres have dramatically increased the literacy rate in Ethiopia.  The 
country’s peasants have been given land from the vast holdings of the imperial 
family and its feudal nobles, and they are no longer required to hand over a 
portion of their meager earnings to the Coptic Church that once helped repress 
them.  Access to basic health services is much greater than it was under Haile 
Selassie.38 
 
  However, most of these improvements were short-lived, done for reasons of self-
interest, or made things worse in the end.  Mengistu focused on literacy (“one of the 
regime’s few undeniable success stories”) so that his cadres could spread the “good 
news” of Marxism: 
Even in the campaign to increase literacy…extending the central 
government’s control over the peasants is a principle theme.  Amharic is 
the language of instruction throughout the country, and the textbooks are a 
vehicle for Marxist indoctrination.39 
 
  He did make good on his promise of “land to the tiller” by divvying up lands 
formerly belonging to Selassie and his cronies.  But this low yield method of sustenance 
farming, especially in areas frequently ravaged by drought, only made the specter of 
famine more real.  The only difference is that many farmers starved on their own land, 
instead of that of absentee landlords.  Mengistu accomplished this by enacting policies 
setting official prices, establishing production quotas, and displacing families to 
collectivized farms. 
  In a country with a Christian tradition longer than many countries in Europe, the 
Coptic Church was a key and powerful institution in Ethiopia, where Selassie was 
considered the one true God—the “Lion of Judah”—by his followers.  Ending payments 
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to the church, as well as executing the patriarch of the church, was designed to reduce its 
power and influence, which had made it a threat to his own.40 
Outcomes in the Post-Mengistu Era: Basic Needs 
  There has been notable improvement for Ethiopians, even as personal liberties 
and civil rights have remained at the same dismal place they were during Mengistu’s 
time.   
Education 
  Ethiopia has seen a marked increase in its educational expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP since 2000, going from 3.5% to 5.5% in 2007.41  However, this 
amount was “virtually unchanged from its 1993–94 level of about 3.0 percent of the 
GDP.”42  Total adult literacy rate during the years 1994-2004 increased from 36% to 50% 
for males, and 18.5% to 22.8% for females;43 from 2004-2008 it increased to 62% and 
39%, respectively.44  Additionally, a number of new universities and colleges have been 
built.  But while educational expenditures and literacy rates have improved in recent 
years, the percentage of trained teachers has dropped considerably.  In primary schools it 
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has gone down from 90% in 2008 to 39% in 2010; in lower secondary schools it has 
decreased from 65% to 54% respectively.45 
Health 
  Life expectancy has increased from 38.4 years in 1960 to 47.0 in 1990 to 58.1 in 
2009; similarly, infant mortality rates continue a precipitous decline, from 152.9 per 1000 
in 1965, to 67.8 in 1990, to 41.0 in 2010.  Malnutrition prevalence as a percentage of 
children under-5 dropped from 42% in 2000 to 34.6% in 2005.46  The percentage of 
urban population with access to water increased steadily from 77% in 1990, to 98% in 
2008.47  While these last two statistics show a positive trend, because the rate has been 
dropping since Selassie was in power this improvement cannot be fully credited with the 
current regime; they can only be commended for contributing to the improvement.  In 
addition, despite some fluctuation, health expenditures as a percentage of GDP remain 
virtually unchanged from 2.1% in 1995 to 2.0% in 2009.48 
Economic Security 
  Ethiopia is categorized by “Low Human Development” by the UN Development 
Program’s “Human Development Index,” ranking 174 out of 187 countries in the world 
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(depressingly, 27 of the bottom 28 are in Sub-Saharan Africa).  Its position improved two 
places between 2006 and 2010, but made no change from 2010 to 2011.49 
  After a small increase, per capita GDP dropped from $250 in 1990 to $124 just 4 
years later, and it remained near that point until 2002.  After that, it increased to a record 
high of $393.70 in 2009, indicating an improvement for everyday Ethiopians.  
Outcomes: Basic Freedoms 
Freedom of Speech 
  Reporters sans Frontières (RSF) ranked Ethiopia 139 out of 178 in its annual 
Press Freedom Index; the government under Zenawi used “Surveillance of the press and 
a decline in the climate for journalists during the May elections.”50 
Stability and Security 
Foreign Policy’s “Failed State Index” uses around  
130,000 publicly available sources to analyze 177 countries and rate them 
on 12 indicators of pressure on the state during the year …Taken together, 
a country's performance on this battery of indicators tells us how stable—
or unstable—it is.51 
 
In the 2011 edition, Ethiopia ranked as the 20th worst state, and was classified as “In 
Danger,” along with neighboring countries that have a have directly contributed to 
Ethiopia’s status in one way or another, such as Eritrea, Uganda, and Kenya. 
The Perception of “Honest Government” 
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Few would argue that during the years Meles Zenawi was in power, he did not act 
like a dictator.  For even if the violence was better hidden, the repression was not.  The 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s “Democracy Index” measures a country’s rank in the areas 
of electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, 
political culture, and civil liberties.   
[It] provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide for 165 
independent states and two territories—this covers almost the entire 
population of the world and the vast majority of the world’s independent 
states (micro states are excluded).52 
 
In 2010, Ethiopia was classified as an “Authoritarian Regime,” ranking 12th from the 
bottom after dropping 13 places since 2008.53  This drop was precipitated by the regime’s 
active and effective repression of “opposition activities, media, and civil society.  The 
passage of restrictive laws governing media, civil society, and political funding was a 
main driver behind the landslide election in May 2010.”54 
Each year, Transparency International publishes its “Corruption Perception 
Index,” which measures “the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 183 countries 
and territories in the world.”55  In 2011, Ethiopia placed 120 out of 182; while this 
ranking may seem relatively positive compared with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, it is 
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worth noting that it tied with nine other countries, including such notables as Iran and 
Chinese-administered Mongolia.56 
Somalia 
  “In the ‘Background Notes’ the State Department provides for every nation in the 
world, I could find only one country labeled with the following description: ‘Government 
Type: None.’ Somalia.” 
-Slate Magazine, January 2, 2007 
  When Mohammed Siad Barre took power in a bloodless coup in 1969, it opened 
the doors to more than 20 years of a repressive, though stable dictatorship.  However, 
despite his efforts to create a sense of nationalism, Somalia’s deep-rooted clan-based 
society was never far beneath the surface, and with it, the roots of chaos.   
Somali society has torn itself in pieces, not only because the institutions set in 
place in 1960 gave play to the rivalries of a clan-structured society but, worse, 
impelled these rivalries with new methods and resources.  So that within a few 
years of independence, this Somalia claimed to possess no fewer than sixty 
parliamentary parties, none of which was or in reality could become more than a 
mask for clientelist rivalries.”57 
 
  In fact, it may have been only Siad Barre’s ill-fated invasion of the Ethiopian 
Province of Ogaden in 1977, forcing the Soviets to take sides—in this case, Somalia’s 
enemy, Ethiopia—that ruined his chances of building a “Greater Somalia” with a 
nationalism that transcended clanism.  “When the government’s irredentist campaign 
ended in humiliating military defeat, it set in motion an implosion of the Somali state.”58  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This, combined with the end of the Cold War and its associated funding and emphasis on 
the Horn of Africa, meant that the “good life” for the Siad Barre regime was ending, and 
with it, his relatively-progressive policies.  Repression soon followed.   
  After over 30 years in power, turbulence and shifting international rivalries 
created the conditions for the United Somali Congress (USC), led by General 
Mohammed Farah Aidid of “Blackhawk Down” fame, to overthrow Siad Barre in 1991.59  
Soon after, the country dissolved into chaos as warlords, well armed from years of proxy 
involvement by the US and Soviet Union, held the only “legitimate” power.  In 2004 the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was founded, taking its seat in Mogadishu in 
2006.60 
The problem in Somalia is not one of a malevolent dictator: unlike neighboring 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, there have not been any real leaders, let alone dictators, in Somalia 
since Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991, nor has there been a true government from 
which a dictator could spring.  The problem is that the TFG of Somalia today is “too 
weak to be strong,” and has proven unable or unwilling to focus on its duty of taking care 
of its people as it faces myriad issues.  It is fighting a real, existential threat in the Islamic 
militant group al-Shabaab.  The TFG is also hamstrung by corruption, having wasted 
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of foreign aid.  “Most of the foreign aid has ended 
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up lining the pockets of opportunists rather than building up the TFG’s capacity.”61  And 
foreign incursions by Ethiopia and Kenya have also weakened domestic support for the 
federal government.   
  There appear to be simply too many issues, many with roots in ethnic 
factionalization and fragmentation, for a weak, fledgling government to handle.  The 
TFG will continue to have trouble strengthening itself as the core institution in Somalia 
as long as it remains squeezed from both internal pressures (such as the efforts to expel 
Ethiopia by the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, discussed further below) and 
external pressures (such as the 2006 invasion by Ethiopia, or 2011 invasion by Kenya).   
  It is the combination of these pressures that has warped the TFG’s sense of 
priorities, since “the yardstick used to assess the TFG’s legitimacy and viability is 
progress in drafting constitutions and establishing committees rather than protecting the 
lives of its own citizens.”62  The ongoing humanitarian emergency in Somalia proves that 
the government has failed at its primary mission: “to provide its citizens with basic 
protection from physical threat and extreme deprivation, whether from war, criminal 
violence, or natural disaster. Everything else should come second.”63 
External Actors 
  Ethiopia has long been influenced by external actors, from Italy in the late 19th 
century and during the early part of World War II (1936-1941), to Britain after liberating !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Ethiopia from Italy in 1941.  It also is important to keep in mind those external actors 
who have played a role in Somalia’s recent past, namely Ethiopia and Kenya, when 
discussing the causes of Somalia’s issues today.  Recent foreign incursions highlight “the 
rapidly deteriorating international approach of the Somali conflict and the intricate 
political choices Somalis have to make.”64  Thus far, Somalis have chosen poorly. 
  Animosity between Somalia and Ethiopia had existed for some time, manifesting 
itself in Siad Barre’s decision to invade the Ethiopia’s Somali-dominated Ogaden 
Providence in 1977 as part of his “Greater Somalia” strategy.  However, massive Soviet 
shipments to Ethiopia—including “tanks fighter aircraft, artillery, armored personnel 
carriers and hundreds of military advisers” (including 17,000 Cubans)65—rapidly 
reversed the gains that Somali forces had quickly made: “When the government’s 
irredentist campaign ended in a humiliating military defeat, it set in motion an implosion 
of the Somali state.”66  These wounds festered for years. 
  In January 2007, TFG-encouraged and US-supported Ethiopian forces invaded 
Somalia, fighting alongside secular militias allegedly backed by the US.  Ethiopia viewed 
the increased influence of fundamentalist groups such as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) 
as a threat to the government, not only because of their fundamental Islamic ideology, but 
also because of the increasing amounts of public support they gained as a result of the 
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stability and security they were able to create.67  While the invasion and subsequent 
ouster of the ICU—at that time the only effective means of governance in the war-torn 
country—allowed the TFG to solidify its rule, it also turned regular Somalis against the 
federal government.  Citizens doubted “whether an American-backed Ethiopian and 
Transitional Federal Government occupation will lead to anything more than another 
weak, violent state and a newfound haven for outside terrorists.”68  And, although the 
Djibouti Peace Agreement (discussed below) resulted in Ethiopia withdrawing from 
Somalia, animosity against the TFG remains. 
  More recently, Kenya invaded Somalia in October 2011 ostensibly as a result of 
kidnapping and killings of Western tourists in Kenya (where tourism is worth $737 
million per year), the operation (called “Linda Nchi,” or “Protect the Country”) quickly 
spiraled out of control, and Kenya is becoming bogged down in guerilla warfare for 
which they are not prepared.69  “Kenyan-TFG forces have moved no more than 70km 
into the country and only control the main roads.  Kenya has had to admit that it cannot 
afford to fight on its terms…The consequences of the misadventure have already blown 
back across the border” into Kenya.70 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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  Not only has al-Shabaab physically struck across Somalia’s southern border, but 
it has also struck at the gains the TFG has made within Somalia’s borders, including key 
efforts to reduce support for al-Shabaab.  “In the face of the Kenyan aggression against 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, all bets are off and we may see 
renewed support for al-Shabaab as happened during the Ethiopian invasion in 2006”71 
(shortly thereafter, Ethiopian forces also returned to Somalia in November 2011).72  
Kenyan troops have also caused suffering at the personnel level, allowing Somalis to 
blame them for their suffering instead of al-Shabaab.  As reprisals for the deaths of 
Kenyan troops, “The army has gone house to house in the area doling out punishment 
beatings to local Kenyan-Somalis.”73  This is hardly a strategy for gaining popular 
support. 
The Issue of Clans 
  Before analyzing ethnic factionalization and fragmentation, it is necessary to look 
at just how deeply the clan system runs in Somali society.  As the UN wrote, “The social 
context of human development in Somalia cannot be understood without reference to clan 
affiliation. Lineage identity is a central organizing force in Somali society.”74  And 
Meredith described the depth of clan loyalty in 2005: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Dirshe. 
72 Howden. 
73 Ibid. 
74 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia, “Somalia,” January-December 
1999, http://reliefweb.int /sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F_R_95.pdf (accessed December 15, 
2011), 9. 
!! 53!
Somalis asked each other not whence they came but to whom they were 
related.  Every child of eight years was expected to be able to recite their 
family’s genealogy through the mail line stretching back some ten or 
twenty generations or more to a common patriarch…No other bond of 
mutual interest had so many far-reaching ramification in all aspects of 
private and public life.75 
 
  With five major clans—the Digil-Mirifleh, the Hawiye, the Isaq, the Dir, and the 
Darod76—one would hope that the right leader could leverage such strong family loyalty 
into a similar sense of loyalty to the nation.  Unfortunately, that same UN report noted, 
“One of the paradoxes of contemporary Somalia is that some of the most powerful social 
and economic forces (such as tribal affiliation) are simultaneously sources of both 
stability and insecurity.”77   
  It had been this way before Siad Barre took power, and one of his main projects 
after the 1969 coup d’état was to press for an end to clanism.   
We will abolish bribery, nepotism and tribalism.  Tribalism was the only 
way in which foreigners got their chance of dividing our people…We will 
build up a great Somali nation, strongly united and welded together to live 
in peace.78 
   
However, once he was president it was his own clan that benefitted from his position.  In 
1986 one author wrote,  
While the Somali population is relatively homogeneous, especially 
compared to those in other African nations, there remain serious rivalries !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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among clans.  Rather than be a conciliator, Siad Barre has kept wealth and 
power in the hands of his own clan and family.79 
 
  For some time, Siad Barre kept the tribes so divided that they could not form an 
effective coalition to fight him.  But in the end it was the clan system that ended his rule 
when he was overthrown by the Hawiye-dominated United Somali Congress (USC) in 
1991.  And with that, “the traditional system that once bound clans to preserve peace, or 
at least stem war, dissipated with the clouds of cordite…nothing short of destroying the 
enemy sub-clan would end the complex blood feud.”80 
Incorporating Clans 
     Given a background such as this, a re-emergent Somali government must find a way 
to deal with the intricacies of the clan system if it is to ever have any hope for creating 
stability.  However, since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, it is not a case of the 
TFG not dealing with ethnic factionalization and tribal fragmentation; it is that Somalia is 
the very embodiment of ethnic factionalization and fragmentation.  With the most tenuous 
grasp of power in Mogadishu, a divided central government, and both external and 
internal pressures, the TFG must gain the consensus of three key groups: the major clans 
besides those in the TFG, moderates in opposition groups such as the remnants of the 
Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), and 
hard-line militants in groups like al-Shabaab.  Doing so may allow the shaky first steps 
towards a legitimacy that is now non-existent.  
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 Attempts by the TFG to include more than just the majority Hawiye clan included 
the “4.5 plan,” where the 92 Parliamentary seats are divided with 61 seats for the 
majority clans and 31 seats for the rest of the clan groups.81  Even with this arrangement, 
“there were groups that felt that they didn’t get their fair share,” according to former US 
Ambassador to Ethiopia, David Shinn.  While there will always be groups that are not 
satisfied with any arrangement, regardless of how well-intentioned it is, efforts must be 
made to include as many stakeholders as possible. 
  With regards to transcending clan loyalties, one example can be seen by studying 
the ICU.  “Through an overarching Islamist ideology, which was able to transcend clan 
allegiance, and a working network of Sharia courts in Mogadishu, the ICU had gone a 
long way to improving security in the capital.”82  The Enough Campaign describes the 
success of the ICU in a 2008 exposé:  
The ICU…was poised to end Somalia’s 16 years of state collapse. The ICU 
quickly delivered impressive levels of street security and law and order to 
Mogadishu and south-central Somalia. It reopened the seaport and international 
airport and began providing basic government services. In the process, the ICU 
won widespread support from war-weary Somalis, even those who did not 
embrace the idea of Islamic rule.83 
 
Though this fundamentalist group did not win friends in the West, they did 
provide the only stability and security Somalia has seen since the fall of the Siad Barre !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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regime.  As former US Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn told TFG leaders in 2010, 
“This is the one area where al-Shabaab has had some success that is welcomed by 
Somalis.”84 
However, putting as much emphasis on fundamentalism as they did, they faced 
the same problem currently facing al-Shabaab: “In trying to articulate a religious idea 
they are too ideological. So they are insensitive to the political calculations and 
compromises they have to make,” costing them popular support.85  A divided ICU may 
have fared well against divided warlords and a weak TFG, but when Ethiopia invaded in 
2006, backed by the US and possessing one of the largest armies in Africa, it came as no 
surprise when they were quickly defeated.86 
An additional method for establishing stability can be found in the wake of this 
invasion.  Although the ICU was quickly defeated, the ARS rose to fill the opposition 
role the ICU had previously played.  After combating the TFG for 16 months—resulting 
in thousands killed and more than a million displaced—the ARS began to discuss a peace 
agreement with the TFG.  Radicals opposed to the peace accord split from ARS, and 
went on to form the more militant al-Shabaab, against whom the TFG is still fighting 
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today.87   
  But it was moderate leadership of the ARS, once violently opposed to the TFG, 
who agreed to attend a peace conference in Djibouti in 2009.88  The outcome was the 
Djibouti Peace Accords, which resulted in Ethiopia withdrawing from Somalia, the 
formation of a new TFG, and the inclusion of the ARS into the parliament; ARS member 
and moderate Islamist Sheikh Sharif Sheekh Ahmed was chosen as president.89  This 
success may serve as a template for the TFG’s ongoing efforts to create stability and 
security: By working with and co-opting moderates, less radical elements, and one-time 
hardliners of opposition movements, the TFG achieved some semblance of compromise 
that was lacking in previous efforts to create a more inclusive government.  It also drove 
a wedge between moderates and more radical elements, alienating the latter and setting 
them up for a targeted military campaign.   
Military Strategy 
Once other clans have been brought into the government, and moderates in 
opposition groups have been co-opted, there will undoubtedly be hardliners and splinter 
factions that remain.  A constraining military approach should never be the primary 
option for a government facing an insurgency.  It is necessary for the re-emergent Somali 
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government to address the conditions that create an environment in which extremists can 
survive, whether these be poverty, corruption, concerns about outside interference in 
domestic issues, etc.  If not, it will simply create a familiar cycle of moderate groups 
being brought into the government fold while new splinter groups, discouraged at 
erstwhile attempts to create stability, continue to fight.   
For those violent groups that will never be brought into the process, it will be 
necessary to use military force, and TFG forces with the manpower and material support 
of African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) must take a coordinated and decisive 
stand against those armed factions that currently keep Somalia unstable.  Alongside 
AMISOM, TFG forces have demonstrated that a coordinated effort against clans and 
rebel groups can be successful, as they were in taking back Mogadishu several times 
since 2007 (of course, “taking back” means they lost it, but this is another issue).   
But any stand they take must be disciplined, as TFG security forces, instead of 
taking care of the Somalis, have become some of the worst perpetrators of violations 
against them.  A 2008 report by Amnesty International notes, “Forces of the TFG are 
frequently reported to act as if they believe they are immune from accountability, 
investigation or prosecution, including for crimes under international law.”90  Such 
conduct will continue to reduce popular support away from government forces. 
  A small but important piece of the military strategy must be to address the issue 
of “technicals,” or civilian vehicles that armed factions have modified with machine guns 
and other types of armaments.  The name comes from civilian agencies having to hire !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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local gunmen and their armed vehicles, but not being able to write it up like this on their 
budgets; instead, they would enter an expense for “technical assistance,” and the name 
was born.91  In a country that saw such a huge influx of arms in Africa during the Cold 
War, especially after the fall of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, simply having an AK-
47 is taken as a given, and grants one neither influence nor status.92  But in an area where 
fuel and other resources are limited and go to the strongest, having a Mad Max-style 
“battle wagon” allows warlords to extend their power base and influence over others.   
Such highly mobile firepower was first used with great effect in the 1980s 
in Chad’s northern Tibesti Mountains by President Hissein Habre against 
Libya-backed rebels.  The lesson of that success was not lost on the 
Somalis, whose battle in the thorny interior and sandy walled city 
alleyways required mobile force.93 
 
Eliminating these vehicles would not end the conflict, but it would remove a significant 
means of fighting it. 
  If al-Shabaab takes the same tack as its al-Qaeda affiliates in the Maghreb, it will 
begin a campaign to gain the support of the population, which is key terrain in an 
insurgency.94  Were these militants to do so, popular support for their cause—or at least 
tolerance for it, which is just as good in a fight such as this—may become so entrenched 
that the government may not be able to gain the population back, and Somalia will 
continue down the road of a failed state, unable to return. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Benefiting from a Dictatorship 
  Somalia today provides a perfect example of where a benevolent dictator could 
make a real difference in establishing security and stability.  During his time in power, 
Siad Barre  
was determined to implement policies to benefit the country economically 
and socially, and to diminish the political influence of the clans.  During 
his regimes early years, Somalia experiences considerable economic 
development, and efforts were made to replace clan loyalty with national 
pride.95 
 
It is how he went about achieving these goals that makes him less than benevolent.  Were 
there a benevolent strongman in power in Mogadishu today, he would have his work cut 
out for him as clan divisions have undoubtedly deepened since the Civil War started in 
1991. 
  In places where the leaders have demonstrated genuine care for their charges, 
conditions are better, showing that progress is possible:  
Famine conditions in the arid northern and central regions [of Somalia] are 
mitigated by responsible local authorities who provide a degree of security 
and are facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance.96 
 
This also provides an example for how a benevolent dictator could interact with NGOs, 
by not only attracting their assistance, resources, and participation in the first place, but 
also by facilitating aid and materiel delivery and distribution by their own people once it 
arrives.  This mitigation must be pursued at the national level.  
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  Until the TFG takes the above steps, Somalis will see the government as no better 
than the terrorists they proclaim to be fighting, as they focus on self-preservation and 
self-enrichment.  This will keep them from enjoying popular support necessary to defeat 
an insurgency.  Once this happens and the government establishes enough “space” to 
consolidate its gains, both politically and militarily, it can begin to focus more on the 
everyday population and address the needs of the Somali people, for whom the current 
catastrophe “could join the ranks of the Rwanda genocide and the Darfur crisis in terms 
of scale and human suffering.”97 
Outcomes 
Regardless of how one analyzes the data on Somalia, the TFG, either as an act of 
omission or commission, has not been an effective governing body.  Despite years of 
foreign aid, “before the end of this year (2011) tens of thousands of people in Somalia—
possibly hundreds of thousands—are going to die.  Aid agencies say nearly 4 million 
people are in need of assistance and 750,000 at risk of starvation.”98  As a further 
indicator of the state of affairs in Somalia, for many data categories (below) organizations 
were unable to collect the data in the first place.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, it is the only 
country with this consistent dearth of information. 
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Basic Needs 
Education 
No data exist on UNESCO, World Bank, the CIA World Fact Book for education 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP, literacy rates, or percentage of teachers that are 
trained. 
Health 
Ironically, one of the only positive signs is life expectancy at birth, which 
continued an upward trend begun in 1960 (the first year for which data is available) at 
36.0 years.  In 1991, it was 44.1 years though on a slight downward direction, but was 
50.6 in 2009 (this is still 19 years lower than the rest of the world, on average).  
Unfortunately, the life children can expect to lead does not imbue one with optimism.99 
The World Bank records an under-5 mortality rate of 180 deaths per 1000 births 
for 1990, 2000, 2008, and 2009, which indicates efforts to ascertain the true number are 
based on secondary, inferential data and are probably not accurate.  To put this statistic 
into context, this number is much better compared with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
121.2, and a worldwide rate of 57.9.100  While Sub-Saharan Africa’s malnutrition rate for 
children under-5 has dropped almost 3 points from 27.3% in 2000 to 24.6% in 2009, in 
Somalia the rate has increased 10% from 22.8% in 2000 to 32.8% in 2006.101 
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Access to an improved water source in urban areas did increase from 36% in 2000 
to 67% in 2008; however, in rural areas it dropped from 17% in 2000 to 9% in 2008.102  
This may indicate the government focusing on urban population centers as a power base, 
similar to the approach that Selassie and Mengistu took while in power in Ethiopia. 
Economic Security 
Again, it is indicative of conditions in Somalia that it is listed in the UNDP’s 
“Human Development Index” as an “other country or territory,” and an absence of data 
that only five other places can beat.103  It is a sad commentary on the state of affairs in 
Africa in general, and Somalia in particular, when things are so bad—with statistics so 
inadequate—that the country is not even ranked in human development.  There also exist 
no data on current per capita GDP, though per capita GDP increased between 1980 and 
1989 a meager 0.9%, and decreased 1.9% between 1990 and 1999.104 
Basic Freedoms 
Freedom of Speech 
In 2010 the Reporters sans Frontières “Press Freedom Index” ranked Somalia 
161 out of 178 and described a “situation of permanent chaos and a culture of violence 
and impunity taking root in which the press has become a favorite target.”  The year prior 
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it was “the world’s deadliest country for the media, with six journalists killed between 1 
January and 4 July.”105 
Stability and Security 
“Three African states…once again top this year's Failed States Index…For four 
years in a row, Somalia has held the No. 1 spot, indicating the depth of the crisis in the 
international community's longest-running failure.”106  This depressing revelation is the 
first thing on Foreign Policy’s webpage ranking the world’s most vulnerable countries, 
and speaks volumes about Somalia’s stability and security. 
The Perception of “Honest Government” 
Simply put, the 2011 Corruption Perception Index lists Somalia tied for last with 
North Korea.107  And in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, because 
members of Parliament are appointed and not elected, Somalia is not a democracy and 
therefore not ranked; but given other indicators above, it is probable that even if it were a 
democracy, it would be near the bottom. 
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  Ethiopia and Somalia present two different cases in the study of dictatorships.  
Ethiopia, ruled by a lineage traced to King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, has been 
under a dictatorship from before Menelik II was Emperor starting in 1889, meaning that 
its people have consistently been under one form of authoritarianism or another for 
centuries.  In Somalia, the chaos and violence since rebel groups overthrew dictator Siad !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Barre in 1991 has frustrated any attempts at creating a government capable of 
establishing stability and security.  It was only the fundamentalist and dictatorial ICU that 
was able to create some semblance of order, albeit at the expense of the Western-backed 
TFG.  In both countries, governments have used resource allocation and a “culture of 
terror” to maintain the status quo, though with some positive outcomes. 
  In Ethiopia, Mengistu withheld foreign aid resources from regions with 
opposition groups, while at the same time ensuring this same aid went to key population 
centers and geographic power bases.  After Mengistu’s downfall, the dictatorship of 
Meles Zenawi withheld political influence and power from non-Tigrayans, while 
concurrently providing it to his fellow Tigrayans and the urban elite, again, in key 
geographic and urban areas.  In Somalia, al-Shabaab often refuses to let food and medical 
aid through to those suffering from the current famine, and has restricted or closed the 
offices of NGOs who wish to work there.108  They have also restricted the flow of 
information out of al-Shabaab-held areas by preventing telecommunication companies 
from entering and setting up services.109  As such, the TFG is able to portray the terrorist 
group as the only thing keeping the situation as bad as it is.  However, were al-Shabaab 
not a factor, clan divisions would undoubtedly play the same role in funneling resources 
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towards certain groups at the expense of others.  In either case, it is regular Somalis who 
suffer. 
  In addition to resources, dictatorships use a “culture of fear” to maintain their 
position.  In Ethiopia, Mengistu leveraged a network of Marxist cadres, socialist planning 
policies like villigization and collectivization, and a parallel security apparatus using 
illegal detentions and torture in order keep the population frightened, submissive, and 
repressed.110  While he ruled, Zenawi stood accused of using electoral fraud, voter 
intimidation, and post-election police violence to win “legitimate” elections, while 
simultaneously jailing journalists and activists, and jamming opposition radio stations.111  
While there is not the sanctioned violence of the “Red Terror” in Mengistu’s days, a 
culture of terror remains for people that have only known dictatorships. 
  In summary, with a national legacy and narrative, a tradition of effective 
administration, and fertile land with incredible hydroelectric potential, there are few 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with the possibilities of Ethiopia.  However until the 
government shows itself more willing to use its powers to leverage these resources 
towards benevolent ends, the only beneficiaries will remain the elite and well-connected, 
and the only positive outcomes those that seem improve regardless of how repressive the 
government is.   
  In Somalia, the TFG has proven too weak to create a culture of terror; but this 
same weakness allows its main opponent to create its own.  This is the dark side of any !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 VanArsdale, 51. 
111 Andy Sennitt, “New Ethiopian Opposition Television Station Jammed,” Media Network, May 
21, 2010, http://blogs.rnw.nl/medianetwork/new-ethiopian-opposition-television-station-jammed 
(accessed December 27, 2011). 
!! 67!
order that al-Shabaab has brought to the areas they dominate: the extreme manner in 
which they enforce it, including stoning and amputations.  Until the TFG is able to end 
the influence al-Shabaab has on Somalia, this terror of culture will continue, and allow 
the terrorist group to remain a “parallel government” within Somalia’s own borders.  
With myriad issues continuing to hamstring efforts to stabilize, Somalia provides 
researchers a great example of where a benevolent dictator could have a positive impact.  
Indeed, perhaps only a dictator can do what a weak and corrupt federal government has 
thus far failed to do—stabilize the country by overcoming clan loyalties, incorporating 
political and military moderates, and defeating (with discipline) hard-line militants. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DRC—SOURCES OF POSITIVE OUTCOMES 
Introduction 
     The overall construct of the first part of this thesis involves alternative means of 
assessing the performance of countries in Africa.  This chapter will ask if the positive 
outcomes in a poorly-performing country can be linked to the government and if so, if 
these modest success stories and prospective sources of improvements, can then be used 
to drive development and bring up lower ranked performance indicators.  It will 
specifically look at the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—ranked 12th from the 
bottom of the Democracy Index, and “Not Free” with very poor political and civil 
liberties scores by Freedom House—with regards to its performance and potential in 
mining, forestry, and wildlife conservation.1 
Background 
The Congolese Civil War began as a result of security concerns in the wake of the 
1994 Rwandan Genocide in which over 800,000 people—mostly Tutsi and moderate 
Hutu—were killed in the space of around 100 days.  Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 
having agreed to an uneasy peace in Arusha, Tanzania after a three-year civil war, once 
again went on the offensive, eventually taking Kigali; Paul Kagame, until then the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!#$$!Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2011: Democracy Under Stress,” 
http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf and Freedom House, “Freedom in 
the World 2012,” 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202012%20Booklet_0.pdf (both accessed 
October 30, 2012).!
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military leader of the Tutsi-dominated RPF, took charge as Vice-President and Minister 
of Defense (he would prove to be the de-facto, and later actual, President)2.  However, 
Hutu militias fearing punishment, and Hutu tribal members fearing retribution, fled the 
country in droves, eventually numbering two million and settling largely in the Great 
Lakes region, notably Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo).  Standing up a 
government-in-exile, and supported by Zairian President Mobuto Sese Seko, they began a 
campaign to destabilize the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government, basing their 
operations out of the refugee camps and employing recently emigrated Rwandan Hutu 
exiles and Congolese Hutus as fighters.3   
As a result of the attacks that followed, Rwanda and Uganda—with assistance 
from Angola and Burundi, and accompanied by local Congolese Tutsi rebels—invaded 
Zaire.  Thus began a series of conflicts subsequently dubbed the “First Congo War” 
(November 1996-May 1997) and “Second Congo War” (August 1998-July 2003), which 
resulted in rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila defeating Mobutu and taking over as 
President.  The conflict is known without hyperbole as “The Great War of Africa,” and 
has had almost incomprehensible outcomes still felt today. 
Where Has All This Left The Congo? 
By many—indeed, most—indicators, DRC has had an abysmal performance 
record.  Whether researching economic measures, human rights, infrastructure 
development, or almost any other metric, the Congo rests uncomfortably near the end of 
the scale.  The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index ranked DRC 155 out of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil (Toronto: Vintage, 2003), 475. 
3 Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 526-527. 
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162.4  Reporters Sans Frontiers’ Press Freedom Index at one time indicated a relatively 
free press when it first started keeping stats in 2002; DRC has since slipped more than 30 
places and consistently ranked lower than 141 out of 178 for seven of the last nine years.5  
And in Foreign Policy’s 2008 to 2011 Failed States Index, DRC ranked 6, 5, 5, and 4 
respectively…from the bottom.6  More than 5.4 million people have been killed since the 
onset of hostilities in 1996, with children accounting for almost 50% of the casualties.  
The war created more than 1.5 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and diseases 
normally preventable or treatable (such as malaria and malnutrition) continue to cause a 
majority of the casualties, with some 45,000 more dying every month.7  The stats go on 
and on in a similar vein. 
But can the bottom rankings for the Congo be taken in absolute terms?  Similarly, 
does the fact that the scores in each of the respective indices are extremely low tell the 
entire story?  In the United Nation’s Development Program’s (UNDP) Human 
Development Index (HDI), DRC ranks 187; it is even lower than such notables as 
Somalia and Niger.  But its HDI score has steadily improved since 2000, when Kabila 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat,” The Economist 
http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf (accessed January 31, 2012). 
5 Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index 2010,” 
http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement& id_rubrique=1034 (accessed January 25, 2012).   
6 Foreign Policy, “Failed States Index 2011,” 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactive_map_an
d_rankings (accessed January 25, 2012). 
7 International Rescue Committee, “Congo Crisis,” http://www.rescue.org/special-reports/congo-
forgotten-crisis (accessed February 26, 2012). 
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took power, at a rate of improvement faster than the world average.8  Ranking last is bad, 
but there is some consolation in ranking last while steadily improving.  As such, is 
improvement like this worth noting when assessing a country?  And is it possible that 
Kabila’s authoritarian—even dictatorial—style of rule has facilitated some of these 
improvements?  This chapter will argue that, despite the atrocities in DRC, there have 
been some areas with positive outcomes that can be linked to the government of Joseph 
Kabila, and which can be used to drive development and bring up lower ranked 
performance indicators. 
Governments worldwide, particularly in developing nations, tout achievements 
and improvements for various reasons: to impress or appease donors in order to ensure 
continued resource flow, to avoid criticism from more liberal donors, or to avoid 
interference from external actors who might raise alarm about other conditions (such as 
human rights abuses).  But it is necessary to discover the true source and nature of a 
purported success before deciding to continue support as continued resources may be 
used for the very programs these governments are attempting to conceal.  In such a case, 
it may be handy to have a template to examine claims that governments make about 
positive outcomes they have had, in order to validate or refute these claims. 
This chapter seeks to examine metrics that seem to indicate some improvement to 
conditions on the ground in DRC—however marginal—and to assess if they are due to 
the actions of the Kabila’s authoritarian administration, or because of some other driver 
or external actor.  To assess these metrics, this chapter will use mining, forestry, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 United Nations Development Programme, “International Human Development Indicators: 
Congo (Democratic Republic of),” http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COD.html 
(accessed February 28, 2012). 
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wildlife conservation in order to help to confirm or deny my hypothesis.  If the DRC is 
making improvements in some areas, whether through policy, program, or proclamation, 
they deserve credit, and continued support, for them.  Continued gains can be used to 
fund the development of other, lower ranking indicators and improve the lives of 
Congolese.  But, if positive outcomes can be tied to something other than Kinshasa’s 
efforts, the government might be put to task, and donors (be they nations, NGOs, or other 
organizations) can re-assess their approach, in hopes of facilitating a truly positive 
outcome. 
Areas of Improvement and Potential 
There are few countries in the world with the collective resources that DR Congo 
has, and mining, forestry, and wildlife conservation have shown both promise and some 
payoff.  While many performance indicators dwell near the bottom of their respective 
scales, these three give one insight into DRC’s potential if the government properly funds 
the correct projects, and most importantly, provides the returns to the people of Congo. 
Mining 
One would be hard pressed to think of African conflict without associating it with 
its rich mineral resources; and whereas Sierra Leone and Liberia made “conflict 
diamonds” a household term, Congo—“the world’s largest producer of cobalt, third 
largest producer of industrial diamonds, and fifth largest producer of copper,” a well as 
considerable uranium deposits9—has been exploited for its resources since Belgian King 
Leopold’s initial interest in the colony because of the availability of rubber trees.  During 
the First Congo War, Kabila’s rebel government granted mining concessions to foreign !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Stearns, 288. 
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companies to help finance the revolution.10  From there it was a small leap to Rwanda 
and Uganda conducting unilateral mining operations, ostensibly for the same reason: 
“Although Rwanda and Uganda possess little or no coltan, during the period of the war in 
the Congo…Rwanda’s coltan export went from less than 50 tons in 1995 to almost 250 
tons in 1998”11 (In November 2011, Kigali returned about 82 tons of minerals12).   
With the shifting alliances of the Second Congo War, and with Rwandan and 
Ugandan troops rapidly approaching the capital, Kabila again sold mining concessions to 
pay his debts to Zimbabwe and Angola, securing their support and averting a military 
defeat.13  Rebel groups continue to use illegal mining as a source of funding since the 
conflict began; this alternative economy provided them with an estimated $185 million in 
2008.14  With an estimated $24 trillion in unrealized mineral deposits, it is clear that 
mining holds great potential for any group willing to take advantage of it (even as it has 
served as a driver of conflict).15 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Ibid. 
11 Conflict Minerals, “Coltan: Learning the Basics,” http://conflictminerals.org/coltan-learning-
the-basics/ (accessed February 3, 2012). 
12 BBC Africa, “Rwanda Gives DR Congo Back Tonnes of Smuggled Minerals,” 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15570648 (accessed February 3, 2012). 
13 Sterns, 291. 
14 Enough Project, “Comprehensive Approach to Congo's Conflict Minerals—Strategy Paper,” 
http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/comprehensive-approach-conflict-minerals-strategy-
paper (accessed February 3, 2012). 
15 UN News Center, “DR Congo: UN Advises Prudent Use of Abundant Resources to Spur 
Development,” 10 Oct 11, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39986 (accessed 
February 25, 2012). 
! 74!
There are several areas where new policies governing the mining industry have 
reaped benefits for DRC.  A rise in world commodity prices in 2008 and 2009 has 
increased the potential return on any state investment into the mining industry.  New 
government policies appear to be having their intended effect: A Swedish NGO wrote 
that, “Today, registered cassiterite and coltan exports are close to known mining capacity 
and fraudulent exports are a fraction of what they once were.”  And USAID and its 
British counterpart, DFID, note improvements between cross-border networks and 
artisanal traders which can improve transparency.16 
There also remains an almost indescribable amount of room for growth.  The 
International Peace Information Service (IPIS) has noted that armed groups—including 
rebels, Rwandan militia, and Congolese army units—control 12 of the 13 major mines in 
Congo; both the UN and IPIS estimate that over 50% of the estimated 200 total mines in 
DR Congo are under control of armed groups17.  If the remaining mines could be properly 
secured, developed, and managed, and when one takes into account the tax revenues that 
the DRC can gain from private mine corporations, the potential positive outcomes to 
harnessing the mining industry’s potential become even more clear. 
However, policies can potentially have a negative impact as well.  There are 
critics who say that regulations such as the 2009 Dodd-Frank Act, intended to block the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Päivi Pöyhönen et al, “Voices From the Inside: Local Views on Mining Reform in Eastern DR 
Congo,” Swede Watch, 
http://www.swedwatch.org/sites/www.swedwatch.org/files/Conflictminerals_report.pdf (accessed 
February 3, 2012), 11. 
17 John Prendergast and Sasha Lezhnev, “From Mine to Mobile Phone: The Conflict Minerals 
Supply Chain,” Enough Project, http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/mine-mobile-
phone?page=1 (accessed February 3, 2012), 2. 
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purchase of conflict minerals that finance rebel groups, are having negative side effects 
on everyday Congolese.  Companies such as Apple, Microsoft, Nintendo, and myriad cell 
phone manufacturers use minerals like coltan in making their electronic components, and 
this embargo (with voluntary compliance) effectively takes the largest consumers of these 
minerals out of the supply chain.  An embargo on these materials could take funding from 
artisanal miners, even as they greatly reduce funding for rebel groups.18  However, it 
could push armed groups out of the mining industry, creating a vacuum into which the 
government can move, establish a credible industry, employ those left jobless by the 
embargo, and reap the benefits described above.   
Concurrently, developing the mining sector should be used other than to simply 
enrich Kabila’s coffers.  Given that most of the mines are located in the most poverty-
stricken areas of Eastern Congo, any funding coming into the country should, at least in 
part, be directed towards sustaining the progress described in this chapter.  If locals 
working in mines do not at some point see the fruits of their labor returned to them at 
least in part, they will once again be fertile grounds for recruitment into rebel group; and 
a mine run by militias is no longer generating capital for the state.  Funding brought in 
from responsibly sourced materials should be used to assist these miners by developing 
human capital and mine production capacity in a way that employs more of locals. 
Forestry 
Besides mining, there is perhaps no other area where the Congo has the potential 
to improve its own situation, or where there is greater risk to its environment, than with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Alert Net, “Conflict Minerals Rules to Pressure Congo Miners,” 
http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/conflict-mineral-rules-to-pressure-congo-miners/ (accessed 
February 3, 2012). 
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properly executed natural resources and forestry programs.  Besides the Congo River 
Basin regulating the world environment, the forests alone are sufficient to fuel 
development: “If they are conserved and managed well, DRC’s forests could provide 
many national and global benefits in perpetuity.”19  However, there has been little in the 
way of forests being “conserved and managed well”: 
While the DRC has a potential for timber exploitation estimated at 10 
million m3/year, official timber exploitation (mainly industrial production) 
amounted to just 310,000 m3 in 2006.  In contrast, artisanal and illegal 
logging was calculated as totaling approximately 1.5-2.4 million m3 in 
2003—up to eightfold official figures.  Both artisanal and industrial 
logging are overshadowed by annual fuel wood and charcoal production, 
estimated at 72 million m3. 20 
 
Poorly regulated companies, many with the bribed consent of local politicians, 
have engaged in “uncontrolled industrial logging” in Congo’s jungles.21  And besides the 
40 million Congolese who depend on the forests “in one way or another” according to 
Greenpeace,22 refugees and others fleeing the ubiquitous violence found safety in the 
forests, but at an environmental cost, especially for those in close proximity to refugee 
camps.  “The end of the Rwandan civil war in 1994 caused 1.5–2 million people to flee, 
largely towards the DRC (then Zaire).  More than 150 km2 of forest from the Virunga !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 World Bank, “DRC’s Forest and Economic Context,” 
http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/countries/africaext/extafrsumessd/extforinafr/0,,content
mdk:22110960~pagepk:210058~pipk:210062~thesitepk:2493451,00.html (accessed February 3, 
2012). 
20 UN Environmental Program, “Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment Synthesis for Policy 
Makers,” http://www.illegal-logging.info/uploads/UNEPDRCPCEAEN.pdf (accessed February 3, 
2012), 36. 
21 Monga Bay, “Deforestation in the Congo,” 
http://rainforests.mongabay.com/congo/deforestation.html (accessed February 3, 2012). 
22 Greenpeace, “The Congo Rainforest of Central Africa,” 
http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/forests/congo (accessed February 24, 2012). 
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National Park was cut by refugees.”23  And that was just from the conflict in Rwanda; 
one can only imagine the negative impact that 1.5 million IDPs from the subsequent 15 
years of war in DRC could have on the rainforests.   
They crisscrossed Congo, fleeing the fighting and avoiding armed bands, fed off 
the land and felled the forests for shelter, campfires, and cooking.  Today, trying to eek 
out a living in squalid conditions, refugees venture farther and farther from camps in an 
effort to forage for food and firewood.24 This not only exposes them to rebel groups and 
makes them vulnerable to rape and other crimes, but also contributes to soil erosion that, 
during the rainy season, reduces usable land even more and increases competition, if not 
outright conflict, over resources that remain.25 This is a microcosm of the cycle of 
resource conflict in Congo today. 
However, there have been federally organized programs by the Congolese 
Government that have successfully slowed logging and deforestation in the Congo River 
Basin.  Encouraged (and partially funded) by the World Bank, DRC has instituted various 
programs to preserve this vital area: In 2008, Kinshasa designated over 50,000 square 
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23 Dirk Draulans and Ellen Van Krunkelsven, “The Impact of War on Forest Areas in The 
Democratic Republic of Congo,” Bren School of Environmental Science and Management (US-
Santa Barbara), 
https://www.esm.ucsb.edu/academics/courses/595E/Session%206/DraulansImpactOfWarpdf.pdf 
(accessed February 3, 2012), 37. 
24 Worldwatch Institute, “UN Refugee Agency Turns to Tree Planting,” 
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5092 (accessed January 29, 2012). 
25 African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, “Natural Resources, the 
Environment and Conflict,” 
http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/reports/Natural_Resources_Conflict.pdf (accessed January 
29, 2012). 
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miles as protected areas, a six-fold increase in areas being conserved.26  And in 2009, DR 
Congo, in conjunction with the Forest Stewardship Council, increased its certification 
program to ensure sustainability among some 4 million hectares of harvesting projects, 
with a goal of having 10 million hectares certified by 201227 (In March 2011, however, 
Greenpeace issued a statement saying they were concerned about the rate at which Congo 
River Basin forests were bring certified, leading to a lack of oversight and compliance28).  
A World Conservation Study found that the benefits to this certification extend to 
wildlife, noting that, “Elephants and apes roam the CIB certified forests concessions at 
densities that rival or surpass the adjacent Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park.”29   
That same year, Congo undertook a comprehensive review of all companies 
operating logging interests in DRC; of the 156 applications (corresponding to 22 million 
hectares), just 65 were approved, and deforestation rates remain a relatively low 0.17% 
per year, lower than both Brazil and Indonesia.30  At the same time, Kinshasa has trained 
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26 Environmental News Service, “Congo Basin Forests Saved by Government Action, Timber 
Certification,” http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/may2008/2008-05-27-02.asp (accessed 
February 3, 2012). 
27 Congo Basin Forest Partnership, “On Its Efforts to Preserve the Congolese Forests,” 
http://www.pfbc-cbfp.org/news_en/items/on-its-efforts-to-preserve-the-congolese-forests.html  
(accessed February 3, 2012). 
28 Greenpeace, “The Case for a Moratorium on FSC Certification in the Congo Basin,” 
http://www.greenpeace.org/africa/Global/africa/publications/FSCMoratorium_BrieferFINAL.EN
G.pdf (accessed February 4, 2012). 
29 Elie Hakizumwami, “Progress of the FSC Certifications in the Congo Basin,” Forest 
Stewardship Council, 
http://awsassets.wwf.es/downloads/elie_hakizumwami_overview_of_fsc_certification_in_the_co
ngo_basin.pdf (accessed February 4, 2012). 
30 World Conservation Society, “New Initiatives in the Congo Basin,” http://www.wcs.org/news-
and-features-main/new-initiatives-in-the-congo-basin.aspx (accessed February 3, 2012). 
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over 5,000 locals in conservation efforts, both providing jobs and expanding the 
government’s “footprint” with which they can track changes and identify potential 
problems earlier.31    
Additionally, Congo’s natural world heritage should be a source of funding that 
could fuel development in those areas most threatened by its loss.  A UN Great Ape 
Survival Partnership (UN-GRASP) report notes that, “DR Congo’s tropical rainforests 
extend over 1.55 million km2 and account for more than half of Africa’s forest resources, 
making them a critical global ecosystem service provider and a potential source of up to 
US$900 million in annual revenue up to 2030 through REDD+ (Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation).”32  Illegal logging itself is costing DRC $4.2 
million per year.33  On the Congo River, the DRC and South Africa signed an agreement 
in November 2011 to develop the Grand Inga hydropower project, which with its 
potential for 40,000 megawatts (mW) of energy, the largest in the world; this would 
greatly eclipse the next two largest producers of hydropower, China’s Three Gorges Dam 
(22,400 mW) and Brazil’s Itaipu Dam (14,000 mW).34   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Ibid. 
32 UN-GRASP, “UNEP Study Confirms DR Congo Biodiversity Under Threat,” http://www.un-
grasp.org/news/60-unep-study-confirms-dr-congo-biodiversity-under-threat (accessed January 29, 
2012). 
33 Note: This amount is not the unrealized revenue available from timber, but rather the amount 
that is taken illegally each year; the unrealized revenue is much higher.  For more, see The 
Encyclopedia Of Earth, “Environmental and Socioeconomic Impacts Of Armed Conflict In 
Africa,” 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Environmental_and_socioeconomic_impacts_of_armed_conflict_i
n_Africa?topic=49473 (accessed January 29, 2012). 
34 Brian Latham, “S. Africa, Congo Plan Pact on World’s Largest Hydropower Project,” 
Bloomburg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-10/s-africa-congo-plan-pact-on-world-s-
biggest-hydropower-project.html (accessed February 4, 2012). 
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Wildlife Conservation 
The bio-diversity present in the Democratic Republic of Congo cannot be 
understated, and its contribution to world bio-diversity—and the threat it faces—is 
widely recognized.  The Wildlife Conservation Society notes that Congo “contains more 
than half of Africa’s remaining rainforest within its borders. In addition to these vast 
lowland rainforests, the country's landscape spans mountain forests, bamboo forests, 
savannas, and marshes that are home to an array of quintessential African animals.”35  
But how has this amazing array of wildlife and biodiversity been affected by the conflict? 
Since 1996, Congo’s wildlife has suffered as rebels, hard-pressed for resources, 
have been accused of killing and eating endangered species like gorillas and 
hippopotami.  The population of the form has declined from 22,000 in 1998 to just 900 in 
2007,36 while the number of Eastern Lowland Gorillas may have declined as much as 
70% during the decade from 1994 to 2004, from 17,000 to 5,000.37  Security affected 
other species as well, as armed groups resorted to poaching on a massive scale: 
The Northern White Rhino, which had its home in the Garamba National 
Park is feared to have been hunted into extinction, while numbers of the 
remarkable Okapi—a forest giraffe only found in DRC—and elephant 
populations are seriously declining.38 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Wildlife Conservation Society, “Where We Work: Congo,” http://www.wcs.org/where-we-
work/africa/congo.aspx (accessed January 29, 2012). 
36 Todd Pittman, “Endangered Gorillas Eaten by Rebel Troops,” The UK Independent, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/endangered-gorillas-eaten-by-rebel-troops-
432583.html (accessed January 29, 2012). 
37 The Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International, “Fossey Fund Starts 3-year Conservation Program 
for Endangered Eastern Lowland Gorilla in Congo,” May 2004, 
http://gorillafund.org/page.aspx?pid=597 (accessed February 24, 2012). 
38 UNESCO, “Rescuing the Congo’s Natural Heritage,” http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/700/ 
(accessed January 29, 2012). 
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And the UN’s GRASP project found that, “DR Congo has the highest level of 
biodiversity in Africa, yet 190 species are classified as critically endangered, endangered 
or vulnerable on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species.”39    
In addition to better-known endangered species, an increase in Congolese 
poaching of “bushmeat” (mostly consisting of monkey, antelope, wild boar, and duiker) 
for sustenance is emerging as a potential issue.  Congolese are hunting and trapping these 
animals in ever-greater numbers, and by one UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) 
estimate, some 1.7 million tons of bushmeat are collected every year.40  This is closely 
related to the illegal logging trade, as the same roads being used to transport extracted 
resources are providing bushmeat hunters access into previously impenetrable rainforests.  
These workers are also a major consumer for the meat, driving the trade even more.41 
However, demonstrating the synthesis of the programs listed above, Congolese 
government successes in forestry have had a positive effect on wildlife conservation 
efforts.  Logging certification programs have resulted in the discovery of an additional 
125,000 Western Lowland Gorillas,42 previously unknown, in the Northern Congo, and 
there has been a 17% increase in the mountain gorilla population in the Virunga National 
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39 UN-GRASP. 
40 UNEP, “UNEP Study Confirms DR Congo's Potential as Environmental Powerhouse but 
Warns of Critical Threats,” http://www.unep.org/drcongo/ (accessed January 29, 2012). 
41 World Conservation Society, “New Initiatives in the Congo Basin,” http://www.wcs.org/news-
and-features-main/new-initiatives-in-the-congo-basin.aspx (accessed February 4, 2012). 
42 The Gorilla Organization, “125,000 Gorillas Discovered in the Congo,” August 6, 2008, 
http://www.gorillas.org/125000_gorillas_discovered (accessed February 24, 2012). 
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Park compared to 20 years ago.43 And improvements via proclamation have had a 
positive outcome as well: rather than allowing commercial harvesting of rainforests, the 
Congolese government began a program of annexing large tracks of acreage heavily 
populated with wildlife to incorporate into existing parks such as the Nouabal-Ndoki 
National Park.44   
And Kabila’s government has taken the lead in efforts to preserve gorillas and 
their habitat, which spans several of the same countries that fought during the First and 
Second Congo Wars.  He hosted the 2007 World Heritage Committee meeting where the 
Kinshasa Declaration was signed.  With signatories such as Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, 
and Angola, was the most ambitious and wide-ranging effort to protect the Great Apes 
and the other elements of DR Congo’s biodiversity.  President Kabila, accompanied by 
the Congolese Prime Minister, personally assured UNESCO Director-General Irina 
Bokova that, “the Government was determined to implement all measures decided by the 
Committee.”45  It is not a little ironic that the same countries that fought for years and 
caused the suffering and death of millions of humans, were able to come together to 
protect hundreds of thousands of man’s closest relative. 
These positive outcomes to wildlife conservation efforts should be a significant 
source of funding for development, as other countries in the region have demonstrated.  
In Rwanda, a concerted government tourism program resulted in the number of tourists to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 World Conservation Society. 
44 Research and Conservation for Congo’s Great Apes, “The Goualougo Triangle Ape Project,” 
http://www.congo-apes.org/triangle.html (accessed February 29, 2012). 
45 UNESCO, “Kinshasa Declaration to Protect DRC World Heritage Sites Signed,” 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/702 (accessed February 29, 2012). 
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national parks growing from 61 in 1994 to 43,000 in 2002; tourism revenue grew from $6 
million in 1995 to $202 million in 2008.  “Tourist arrivals46 are projected to increase 
from about 980,000 in 2008 to over 2 million in 2020, thereby increasing foreign 
exchange earnings from about US$ 200 million to over US$ 600 million.”47  In Tanzania, 
the government codified its tourism strategy in the Tourism Policy of 1991 and Tanzania 
Investment Act of 1997.  As a result, the number of tourists increased from 153,000 in 
1990 (generating $65 million)48 to almost 640,000 in 2008 (generating $1.2 billion); 
additionally, tourism currently generates 719,000 jobs for Tanzanians.49   
Thus far, the Kabila administration—perhaps understandably—has not shown a 
sincere desire to develop the tourism industry in Congo.  It currently only invests 2.2% of 
its total investment in tourism (and it is projected to decrease to 1.9% by 2021).  As a 
result, Congo ranks last in the world (out of 181 countries) for the tourism’s contribution 
to GDP relative to the national economy.  And tourism is responsible for only 7,000 jobs 
(14,000 including jobs indirectly related to the industry).50  But DRC’s Virunga National !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Tourist arrivals count visitors to the county who list “tourism” as their reason for their visit on 
their entry form; not all of these go to National Parks, and even fewer pay the $500 permit fee to 
trek with gorillas.  In any case, the number of permits is extremely limited, with some people 
traveling all the way to Kigali only to find there are none available for the dates of their visit. 
47 Hannah Nielsen and Anna Spenceley, “The Success of Tourism in Rwanda: Gorillas and 
More,” World Bank, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/258643-
1271798012256/Tourism_Rwanda.pdf (accessed February 4, 2012). 
48 Nathanael Luvanga and Joseph Shitundu, “The Role of Tourism in Poverty Alleviation in 
Tanzania,” University of Dar es Salaam, http://www.repoa.or.tz/documents/03.4_-
_Luvanga_Shitundu_.pdf (accessed February 4, 2012). 
49 Tanzania Tourism Sector Survey, “2008 International Visitors’ Exit Survey,” http://www.bot-
tz.org/Publications/TTSS/2008_Survey.pdf (accessed February 4, 2012). 
50 World Travel and Tourism Council, “2011 Travel and Tourism Economic Impact: Congo,” 
http://www.wttc.org/site_media/uploads/downloads/congo.pdf (accessed February 4, 2012). 
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Park, home to one of the most active volcanoes in Africa, may shows a glimpse of tourist 
potential, with no visitors in 2008 but 550 the next year; it doubled each year afterwards, 
with 3,800 visitors in 2011.51 If this success can be expanded across the DRC’s five 
national parks listed as a UNESCO’s World Heritage Site—and the three more that have 
been submitted—this area holds yet another area with potential for growth to drive 
development.52   
Conclusion 
It should not come as a surprise that like many other areas in the Congo, mining, 
forestry, and wildlife conservation have suffered greatly because of the ongoing conflict 
there.  It takes very little effort on the part of a researcher to identify depressing statistics, 
saddening data, or stories of a failed government and a suffering population.  However, 
there are some positive outcomes—glimmers of hope in a pile of long-smoldering 
ashes—that can be credited to Joseph Kabila’s administration in Kinshasa which hold 
potential for an improvement to the human condition there.   
Mining and forestry have made significant gains, in large part due to the policies 
and actions of the government in Kinshasa.  Properly developed, managed, and secured 
sites could prove a rich source of revenue in the future from legal exports, taxes on 
corporations, and eliminating losses due to illegal mining and logging.  Tourism still lags 
behind with regards to government focus, but must be recognized as being more directly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Nichole Sobecki, “Volcanoes: Hottest Thing in Congo,” The Global Post, 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/111128/congo-volcano-tourism-
economy (accessed February 4, 2012). 
52 UNESCO, “World Heritage Sites: Congo,” http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/cd (accessed 
January 29, 2012). 
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affected by the lack of stability and security in the very regions tourists would visit.  In 
other countries in Africa, a concerted effort on the part of the federal government to 
harness their countries potential these areas has netted financial rewards, kept it in good 
standing with international bodies, and encouraged growth and development.  In Rwanda, 
where tourism is the top revenue earner, per capita GDP is growing at 7.5%; in Tanzania, 
where it is second, the growth rate is 7.0%.53 
Although a strong, centralized government rules from Kinshasa, Kabila’s 
ministers need to play a key role in ensuring that these gains are realized.  First and 
foremost, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) must secure the hinterland or, given the current 
security situation, efforts at improvement will likely be frustrated.  In mining, both the 
MOD and the Ministry of Mining (MOM) must synchronize their efforts; the former 
should end its role in the production aspect of mining and instead direct their efforts 
towards securing the mines not currently run by the national government.  This would 
allow the MOM to focus on developing Congo’s incredible mining potential.   
In forestry, The Ministry of the Interior, along with the Ministry of Forestry, must 
continue to judiciously screen applicants for logging concessions.  Additionally, they 
must find a way to balance the needs of refugees who scratch out a living from the 
forests, and the need to conserve the forests themselves.  Efforts in these areas can help 
secure a revenue stream from properly regulated logging and hydropower projects, both 
of which can be used to fuel improvements in other areas.  And in wildlife conservation, 
the Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation, and Tourism (MENCT) should work !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 World Bank, “GDP Growth (annual %),” 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/1W-TZ-
RW?display=graph (accessed February 4, 2012). 
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to keep issues concerning DR Congo’s fragile eco-system in front of the national 
government, highlighting potential funding from tourism and international donors.  
MENCT efforts at training and educating locals not only provides jobs, but also can 
increase awareness in myriad areas via a much larger footprint throughout the country, 
helping to identify any problems at a more embryonic stage. 
International actors have and can continue to play an important role in the above 
efforts.  Bodies such as the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and Dian Fossey’s 
“Gorilla Organization” not only raise awareness about issues that nations are facing, but 
also bring expertise and (perhaps more important to cash-strapped governments) funding 
that can help drive the implementation of best practices.  Rather than distract from 
nascent efforts by the governments themselves, these groups can leverage their resources 
in order to influence the policies and practices in at-risk regions, resulting in a more 
positive outcome for their respective area of concern. 
This conclusion is not to say that more gains could not be made, either more 
efficiently or more effectively.  It is also not to absolve Kabila’s administration for its 
role in a 15-year conflict that has claimed more lives than any other since World War II.  
It says only that there has been improvement in some areas that can hopefully serve as a 
springboard for future successes, and that improvement like this worth noting when 
researchers, politicians, and policy makers are assessing a country.  This chapter also 
attempts to provide a template by which donors, NGOs, and government actors may 
assess claims about achievements by leaders of developing nations, in order to assess the 
source of these accomplishments and make decisions from there.   
! 87!
When assessing only quantifiable metrics, some analysts—understandably—come 
to the conclusion that the Democratic Republic of Congo is a failed state.  There are 
undoubtedly justifiable concerns about how long DRC will last, even as some wonder 
how badly it has collapsed already.  Kinshasa needs to leverage opportunities in natural 
resources and mining, forestry, and wildlife conservation, whether through policy, 
program, or proclamation.  At the same time, they must allocate sufficient resources 
towards improving the components of human development indicators.  When you are 
ranked last in most of them, you have nowhere to go but up.  The above 
recommendations will obviously not put DRC on par with any developed nations, and 
might only put it “less behind” other developing nations, with its “bottom” higher than it 
is right now.  At the very least, this may be an improvement for everyday Congolese, 
who certainly deserve a better outcome than they have seen for decades. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: ETHIOPIA—THE USE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
Introduction   
Foreign policy is not simply one country’s view towards another, or a list of 
intentions when dealing with other states.  It is actions manifested in the proactive use of 
various tools in order to affect desired outcome of relations between two or more states.  
Put simply by former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, “Foreign policy is getting 
someone to do something you want.”1  All countries have some means of promoting 
proactive foreign policy, but were a country to be a “one-trick pony” relying singularly 
on military force, economic sanctions, or other carrots or sticks, it would be severely 
limited in its ability to impact the decision making of other countries in order to achieve 
its desired outcomes.  Foreign policy is only effective if there are a number of tools in the 
hands of those in charge of setting and implementing it, and thus the more effective tools 
a country has, the more the potential for foreign policy to be implemented. 
Additionally, it is useful to examine the relationship between “policies” and 
“programs” with regards to foreign policy.  Usually, policies drive programs, as when 
President Kennedy, eager to institute policies that would “counter negative images of the 
‘Ugly American’ and Yankee imperialism,” created the US Peace Corps in 1960.2  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Madeline Albright, in a speech at the University of Denver, April 13, 2012. 
2 National Archives, “Teaching With Documents: Founding Documents of the Peace Corps,” 
http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/peace-corps/ (accessed May 22, 2012). 
! 89!
However, programs can also serve as an impetus for policies; the Kennedy administration 
again provides a pertinent example.  Existing programs of technological advancement 
were codified into a government policy regarding the space program in the wake of the 
Soviets putting the first man on the moon: 
The moon program was a lever by which the young President, who 
extolled vigor and assaults on The New Frontier, and the nation, which 
seemed to have lost faith in itself, could find their legs and come to grips 
with the internal and external challenges of the post-Sputnik World.3 
 
Determining which came first can illuminate potential outcomes.  If a policy is 
created first, the program (usually the execution side) can be custom-built to fit within the 
stated policy framework.  However, if the program comes first, a policy can still be 
created from it, but the program may need to be modified from its original format.  This 
can change what it looks like on the ground and potentially impact the effectiveness that 
made it a driver of the policy in the first place. 
For the US, its approach to foreign policy has evolved as it, too, has evolved as a 
nation.  Especially since the end of the Cold War, the threat of military force as a singular 
means of implementing its desires has been diminished, both because of the fiscally 
prohibitive nature of troop deployments, as well as an increasing awareness that such 
deployments have rarely endeared America to the rest of the world.  As such, the US has 
relied more and more on the Department of State (DoS) and its ability to leverage soft 
power (or more recently, “smart power”) to deal with other nations.   
But the Department of Defense (DOD) does have a key role in the 
implementation of foreign policy.  Through strategic partnerships, low-level !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Walter McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1985), 19. 
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engagements, joint training exercises, and various on-site funding programs, the US 
military has worked closely with key partners around the world, and Africa is no 
exception.  It has used military assistance programs such as Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), and 
International Military Exchange and Training (IMET) as tools of foreign policy on the 
continent. 
Some critics accuse the US for giving military assistance to repressive 
governments, which then use it against their own people.  Military training and aid, the 
argument goes, is used to counter internal dissent rather than build capacity or prevent 
destabilization by external forces.  This runs counter to AFRICOM’s beliefs that, 
“diplomacy, development, and defense should work hand in hand—and in balance—to 
achieve long-term security.”4  However, one must consider that when US assistance goes 
to governments in countries that are already repressive, the US can (and does) leverage 
military aid to steer their behavior towards less repressive outcomes, or to punish 
violations.   
This chapter will analyze military assistance through this lens, looking 
specifically at Ethiopia as a crucial case study.  "#$%&'%(!)(*!+$&*,-!.,+(/*,!&0!#$,!1,-2#$!&0!3&4,5-!5,1(#%&-*!)%#$!#$,!67!8*%-+,!9:;<=>!#$,!(3&/-#!&0!(%4!%#!5,+,%?,*>!%#*!5,1(#%?,1@!1&-2A4/5(#%&-!2&?,5-3,-#*>!%#*!*#5(#,2%+!1&+(#%&-!%-!#$,!B&5-!&0!C05%+(!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Robert Moeller, “The Truth About AFRICOM,” Foreign Policy, July 21, 2010, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/21/the_truth_about_africom?page=0,1 (accessed 
April 17, 2012). 
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This chapter will examine patterns in assistance provided via four different 
programs: IMET, FMF, DCS, and FMS funding.  It will also analyze the level of 
repression there using a collection of indicators of basic freedoms, as well as specific 
incidents of repression.  Further, it will analyze legislative efforts to prevent military 
assistance from being used by repressive governments, and the statements of US 
Government officials.   
This chapter will then demonstrate that the US had been willing to withhold some 
specific military assistance from repressive African governments in order to punish 
human rights violations prior to September 11th.  However, afterwards, because of 
strategic considerations, the US has chosen to instead shift the type of military assistance 
Ethiopia receives in order to preventing the US from being complicit in further 
repression, while addressing regional security concerns.  It will show that legislative 
efforts to link military assistance to human rights have largely been unsuccessful because 
of these same regional security concerns.  Finally, it will conclude that it is possible to 
balance security considerations with human rights concerns through the use of military 
assistance. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!F!However, while Ethiopia does provide a great case study for linking aid and repression, one 
must be careful when extrapolating the findings here across other countries.  While the case-study 
methodology is sound, differing circumstances for each country must be taken into account. 
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Background 
1960s 
Africa, long the colonial purview of European nations, had enjoyed only cursory 
interest by the US through the first half of the 20th Century.  Both because it had already 
been long divided between Continental nations (the infamous “Scramble for Africa”), and 
because of American focus on expanding its influence in the Pacific, the US only had had 
oblique interests there.  However, with the spread of Communist-backed revolution in the 
1960s, the US took a more direct interest, playing both a direct and indirect role in the 
affairs of many nations.  Unfortunately, as this period of time coincided with many 
liberation movements in Africa, some nations still begrudge the US for the role it took in 
supporting repressive governments as a bulwark against Communism.6   
1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and the Emergence of African Terrorism 
The countries in Africa that had achieved independence during the 1960s spent 
the following decade consolidating their gains.  Of the 54 independent African countries 
today, 32 countries (almost 60%) became independent in the 1960s, and 17 of these 
happened in 1960 alone (14 French colonies, 2 British, and 1 Belgian); 9 more became 
independent in the 1970s.7  This state of near-constant change and subsequent power 
struggles may have contributed to the lack of centralized government and a focus on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Author’s conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Christian Ramthun, Defense Attaché, US 
Embassy, Namibia, November 2010. 
7 Central Intelligence Agency, “Field Listing: Independence,” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2088.html (accessed May 17, 
2012). 
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consolidation of power, creating the conditions that would facilitate terrorist group 
formation in the ensuing decades. 
US interest in the Middle East greatly expanded in the late 1970s and 1980s with 
the emergence of petrol states, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the appearance of 
terrorist groups and state sponsored terrorism.  The storming of the US Embassy in Iran 
in 1979, the bombing of the US Embassy and Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983, and the 
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1989 thrust the region to the 
forefront of US national security policy (US Central Command was created in 1983).8  
Meanwhile, key events in Europe—the fall of the Soviet Union, as well as conflicts in 
Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and other places—further distracted the US from events in 
Africa.  Terrorist groups were largely missed until they became more active.   
Osama bin Laden, departing Afghanistan in 1989 the Soviets defeat, tried to 
return Saudi Arabia but was exiled by his own country.  He took sanctuary in Sudan, and 
began consolidating his operations there.9  In 1998, his Al-Qaeda operatives in Kenya 
bombed US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which resulted in the deaths of 223 
people.10  The Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (MICG) began in 1998 with fighters 
who had trained in Afghanistan, and subsequently conducted several deadly attacks in 
that country, including the Casablanca Bombings in 2003; the group was also linked to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Frontline: Target America, “Terrorist Attacks on Americans, 1979-1988,” PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html (accessed April 19, 2012). 
9 Bill Moyers, “Brief History of al-Qaeda,” PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/07272007/alqaeda.html (accessed May 17, 2012). 
10 CNN, “U.S. Missiles Pound Targets In Afghanistan, Sudan,” August 20, 1988, 
http://articles.cnn.com/1998-08-20/us/9808_20_us.strikes.01_1_sudanesetelevision-bin-mullah-
abdullah?_s=PM:US (accessed April 19, 2012). 
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the Madrid train bombings in 2004, which killed 191 people.11  The Armed Islamic 
Group (based in Algeria), founded to train fighters for Afghanistan, became militarily and 
politically active in 1992 (although a majority of its attacks occurred after 2007).12   
After September 11th 
The US Department of Defense had previously divided Africa between 
CENTCOM, Europe Command (EUCOM), and to a lesser extent, Pacific Command 
(PACOM).  While the nations of North Africa and the Horn of Africa fell under 
CENTCOM, the islands off the southeast coast (Madagascar, Comoros, and Mauritius) 
fell under PACOM.13  The remaining 42 nations of Africa were the purview of EUCOM, 
whose Area of Responsibility (AOR) was so immense that a scattering of operations 
occurred: 
United States European Command covered more than 13 million square 
miles and included 91 countries and territories.  This territory extends 
from the North Cape of Norway, through the waters of the Baltic and 
Mediterranean seas, most of Europe, parts of the Middle East, to the Cape 
of Good Hope in South Africa.14 
 
Domestic post-9/11 discourse largely involved US strategy in dealing with al-
Qaeda and other terrorist and insurgent groups in the Middle East, the purview of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Carlos Jesus, “The Current State of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group,” Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-current-state-of-the-
moroccan-islamic-combatant-group (accessed April 19, 2012). 
12 Global Terrorism Database, “Al-Qa`ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM),” Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=20033 (accessed April 19, 2012). 
13 Lauren Plouch, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in 
Africa, Congressional Research Service, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128839.pdf 
(accessed April 12, 2012), 2-3. 
14 Global Security, “US European Command,” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/eucom.htm (accessed April 19, 2012). 
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CENTCOM.   Additionally, once military operations commenced in Afghanistan 
following September 11th, 2001, EUCOM was working to coordinate efforts among 17 
nations from its AOR that were participating in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).15  
Meanwhile, both al-Qaeda franchises and independent organizations increased their 
presence in the Trans-Sahel region of Africa, which increasingly caught the attention of 
US analysts.  By 2006, the plethora of issues in Africa had become abundantly clear to 
the EUCOM Commander at the time, General Bantz J. Craddock: 
The increasing strategic significance of Africa will continue to pose the 
greatest security stability challenge in the EUCOM AOR. The large 
ungoverned area in Africa, HIV/AIDS epidemic, corruption, weak 
governance, and poverty that exist throughout the continent are challenges 
that are key factors in the security stability issues that affect every country 
in Africa.16 
 
That same year, Secretary of Defense Gates spoke of “a more effective and 
integrated approach than the current arrangement of dividing Africa between Central 
Command and European Command, an outdated arrangement left over from the Cold 
War.”17  In response to destabilizing threats, the risk of failed states, and increasing 
awareness of the strategic importance of Africa, the US created only its second Unified 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Lieutenant Colonel David R. McClean and Captain Phillip E. Henson, “Moving the Force 
Across Europe: EUCOM’s Joint Movement Center,” Army Logistician, 
http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/SepOct04/europe.html (accessed April 19, 2012). 
16 J. Peter Pham, “The Time is Now for a US Africa Command,” World Defense Review, 
http://worlddefensereview.com/pham120706.shtml (accessed April 19, 2012).  
17 Robert Gates, Transcript of Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, US 
Africa Command, February 6, 2007, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=5458&lang=0 
(accessed April 19, 2012).  
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Combatant Command since 1963: AFRICOM.18  In doing so, the US had established a 
more integrated focus on the continent, but what of the repressive countries with which it 
dealt? 
Repression in Africa and Ethiopia 
As noted elsewhere, examples of repression in Africa abound.  In Sudan, 
“Government authorities pursued familiar repressive tactics including harassing, 
arresting, detaining, and torturing perceived opponents of the government; censoring 
media; and banning political parties.”  Further south, “The human rights situation in 
Malawi deteriorated significantly in 2011, with President Mutharika’s government acting 
in an increasingly repressive manner.”  In East Africa, “the unnecessary use of lethal 
force by Ugandan security forces resulted in the deaths of nine people.”  And in Kenya, 
“there was little progress on the ground in terms of accountability for post-election 
violence [in 2007] or human rights violations by security forces.”19 
 Ethiopia itself has long had a reputation for repressive policies, some of which were 
facilitated by outside aid.20  President Haile Miriam Mengistu, who ruled from 1974-
1989, was particularly adept at this: For example, at the height of the famine in the 1980s, 
when foreign donors had given more than 1.7 million tons of grain, it would rot on piers 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 PACOM and EUCOM were established in 1947, SOUTHCOM in 1963, CENTCOM in 1983, 
and NORTHCOM in 2002.  For more details on the UCCs, see 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2009/0109_unifiedcommand/. 
19 Human Rights Watch, “Africa: Essential Background,” January 22, 2012, 
http://www.hrw.org/by-issue/essential-background/7 (accessed April 22, 2012). 
20 Human Rights Watch “Development Without Freedom: How Aid Underwrites Repression in 
Ethiopia,” http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia1010webwcover.pdf (accessed 
April 22, 2012). 
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because Mengistu withheld Soviet-supplied military trucks and planes, diverting them to 
the resettlement effort instead.21  He spent $200 million celebrating the tenth anniversary 
of the revolution that brought him to power in a coup that overthrew longtime emperor 
Haile Selassie (himself no benevolent ruler), and then told foreign donors he did not have 
the resources to purchase food.22  Limited fuel supplies were also reallocated to other 
military operations and away from relief organizations.23  As a direct result of Mengistu’s 
policies, some 400,000 people died.24 
     There has been little good governance since Mengistu was overthrown in 1991, and 
consequently Ethiopia’s ranking in several metrics of repression are among the lowest in 
the world.  The following table offers a snapshot of repression since election violence 
erupted in 2005: 
Table 1: “Ethiopia’s Repression Rankings”25 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Jason Clay and Bonnie Holcomb, Politics and the Ethiopian famine, 1984-1985 (Cambridge: 
Cultural Survival, 1986), 31. 
22 Doug Bandow, “Mengistu's Policies Responsible for Famine,” Human Events 46:15 (1986: 
April 12), 13. 
23 Samuel D. Kaplan, Surrender or Starve: Travels in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea 
(New York: Vintage: 2003), 149. 
24 Alexander DeWaal’s estimate in a 1991 Human Rights Watch report is much lower than the 
official UN estimate of around 1 million people, for which the UN was roundly criticized.  For 
more, see Alexander DeWaal, Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia (New York: 
Human Rights Watch, 1991), 175. 
25 The second number in each is the number of countries in that year’s sample.  For more, see 
Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index,” http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-
2012,1043.html.  Fund For Peace, “Failed States Index,” 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi.  Transparency International, “Corruption Perception 
Index,” http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/.  Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index,” 
https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=demo2010.  All accessed April 22, 
2012). 
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Military Assistance Programs 
 AFRICOM, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, overseas all US military 
operations in Africa, and is commanded by a 4-Star General who reports directly to the 
Secretary of Defense.  Under AFRICOM, each branch of the US military (Army, Navy, 
Air Force, and Marines) has a separate Component Command (COCOM), commanded 
by a 2-Star General and variously based around Europe.26  This set-up is designed to 
allow for the most effective, decentralized implementation of military programs 
throughout the continent.  A primary means by which the US military interacts with 
African partner nations is via Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), 
based on a former French military site at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.   
 Their stated mission is to conduct “operations in the combined joint operations area 
to enhance partner nation capacity, promote regional security and stability, dissuade 
conflict, and protect U.S. and coalition interests.”27 Given the proximity of countries such 
as Yemen, Somalia, and Qatar, it is not hard to assume the level intelligence gathering 
that occurs there as well.  Additionally, Obama administration officials have spoken 
about bases for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).28  All of the above make a positive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Africa Command, “Command Organization Chart,” 
http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/AFRICOM%20Org%20Chart.pdf (accessed May 17, 2012). 
27 CJTF-HOA, “Fact Sheet,” US AFRICOM, 
http://www.hoa.africom.mil/pdfFiles/Fact%20Sheet.pdf (accessed May 17, 2012). 
28 Craig Whitlock and Greg Miller, “U.S. Assembling Secret Drone Bases in Africa, Arabian 
Peninsula, Officials Say,” Washington Post, September 20, 2011, 
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relationship between the US and partner nations such as Djibouti and Ethiopia very 
important to mutual security objectives.  To help maintain this relationship, the US uses 
military assistance programs, including:  
• Foreign Military Sales:  
A government-to-government program through which the U.S. 
Government sells conventional military weapons, equipment, and services 
to allied and friendly nations to assist them in meeting their legitimate 
defense requirements.29 
 
• Foreign Military Financing:  
Provides grants for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, 
and training. It is intended to promote U.S. national security by 
contributing to regional and global stability, strengthening military support 
for democratically-elected governments and containing transnational 
threats, including terrorism and trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and 
persons.30 
 
• Direct Commercial Sales: “Regulates and licenses private U.S. companies' 
overseas sales of weapons and other defense articles, defense services, and military 
training.”31 
• IMET:  
Provides training and education on a grant basis to students from allied 
and friendly nations...IMET facilitates the development of important 
professional and personal relationships, which have proven to provide !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-building-secret-drone-bases-in-
africa-arabian-peninsula-officials-say/2011/09/20/gIQAJ8rOjK_story.html (accessed April 19, 
2012). 
29 Department of State, “Foreign Military Financing Account Summary,” 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rsat/c14021.htm (accessed April 19, 2012). 
30 Department of State, “Third Party Transfers and FMS Teams and Functions,” 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm (accessed April 19, 2012). 
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U.S. access and influence in a critical sector of society that often plays a 
pivotal role in supporting, or transitioning to, democratic governments.32 
 
The Use of Aid to Ethiopia 
The US has a history of providing military assistance to Ethiopia to counter 
threats of the day, as well as tying this aid to reports of human rights abuses.  From 1946 
until 1975, the US gave $286.1 million (two-thirds of the total military assistance that 
Washington gave to Africa) in order to counter Soviet efforts in the region.33  The 
equipment mostly consisted of aircraft (including the F-86 fighter jet, the T-28D, the F-5, 
and trainer and transport platforms), as well as a grant of $30 million in arms and 
ammunition in 1974, and the sale of nearly $200 million worth in 1975.34   
However, when Mengistu took power via a bloody coup d’état caused the deaths 
of thousands of people, “Secretary of State Cyrus Vance [informed] the Senate 
Appropriations Committee on Foreign Operations that grant military assistance to 
Ethiopia was being suspended because of human rights violations.”35  President Carter 
cancelled $106 million worth of military aid grants, credit, programs, and arms 
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Department of State, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/65533.htm (accessed April 19, 2012. 
33 Ed. Robert Rotberg, Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings 
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deliveries.36  During the solidifying portion of Mengistu’s reign, from 1979 until 1989, all 
US military assistance stopped, but once Mengistu was overthrown, it quickly returned: 
Between FY 90 and FY 01, Ethiopia concluded nearly $10 million in 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and approximately $260,000 in Direct 
Commercial Sales (DCS).  During the same period, Ethiopia received 
over $7 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and more than $2 
million in International Military Education and Training (IMET)... 
Ethiopia received over $11 million in U.S. defense articles through the 
Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program.37   
 
In 1998, the US again withheld military assistance to Ethiopia in response to the 
human rights violations during the invasion of Eritrea.  The US suspended delivery of 
two C-130 Hercules aircraft (two others had already been delivered), but offered to 
continue delivery as part of a peace agreement.  A US diplomatic cable later noted that, 
“the Ethiopians have been long resigned to the fact that the remaining C-130s are no 
longer available… tensions remain and the two C-130s could not be held and were sent to 
Latin America.”38 
After September 11th, the US has seen Ethiopia as an ally and “front-line state” in 
the fight against terrorism, sharing as it does a border with both Sudan and Somalia, with 
their respective associations with al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab.  As a result of this strategic 
location and potentially because of their continued and sizeable contribution to UN 
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Peacekeeping Operations (it is the fifth-largest contributor of troops in the world),39 the 
increase in aid has been significant: 
• Total military aid sent in the five years after September 11th was two-and-a-
half time greater than the total sent before.   
• Compared to the five years before September 11th, the five years after saw a 
doubling of U.S. arms sales to Ethiopia.  
• Ethiopia has also benefitted intra-regionally and strategically from 
membership in the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP); the 
Anti-Terrorism Assistance program (ATA) (part of the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, 
Demining, and Related Activities, or NADR); the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative 
(EACTI); and the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) 
program.40 
Then in May 2005, 193 people died and more than 700 were wounded by 
Ethiopian security forces during protests over Prime Minister Zenawi’s victory that gave 
him two-thirds of Parliament, this amid accusations of voting irregularities, intimidation, 
and fraud.41  US Humvees, sold to the regime ostensibly for counter-terrorism operations, 
were used extensively by Ethiopian security forces to fire on protestors during the 
violence.  In response, the US ended sales of Humvees to the country.42  Vicki !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Center for Defense Information. 
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41 Anthony Mitchell, “193 Protesters Said Killed in Ethiopia,” Washington Post, October 18, 
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Huddleston, former Ambassador to Addis Ababa, said, “These vehicles were only for use 
in anti-terrorist activities. We have now decided not to sell any more Humvees to the 
Ethiopian army.”43  In this case, the US withheld further assistance to Ethiopia when 
elements of this assistance were used to commit human rights violations. 
 In late December 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia, arguing against the threat 
posed by the fundamentalist-leaning Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu.  Addis 
Ababa received support from Coalition Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) 
advisors based at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti.  This task force had a long-established 
relationship with Ethiopia, which “included the sharing of battlefield intelligence on the 
Islamists' positions...John D. Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence at the 
time, then authorized spy satellites to be diverted to provide information for Ethiopian 
troops.”44  The operation, while largely successful tactically, resulted in numerous 
accusations of human rights violations:   
The UN reports that 400,000 Somalis have had to flee their homes in the 
wake of post-invasion violence.  A recent Human Rights Watch report 
concludes that while atrocities have taken place on all sides, 
Ethiopian/TFG forces have conducted the worst abuses, including 
deliberate attacks on civilians.45 
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It seems that in this case, elements of US military assistance, although not directly the 
cause of human rights violations, played an indirect part in the effectiveness of Ethiopian 
forces, likely putting them in a position by which they could commit these violations.  
Violations of human rights in 2005 and later, after the Somali invasion, served as the 
impetus to US legislative efforts to restrict military assistance to Ethiopia. 
Legislative Efforts 
Several bills specific to Ethiopia were introduced in Congress, starting when 
Representative Chris Smith (D-NJ) introduced the “Ethiopia Consolidation Act of 2005.”  
It was intended to introduce legislation that would “suspend joint security activities until 
a certification is made that Ethiopia is observing international human rights standards and 
enforcing the principle of the rule of law,” and “prohibits nonessential [security] U.S. 
assistance to Ethiopia if the government of Ethiopia obstructs U.S. technical assistance to 
Ethiopian opposition parties.”  The bill was introduced to the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, but did not move past this stage.46   
Smith tried again a year later with the “Ethiopia Freedom, Democracy, and 
Human Rights Advancement Act of 2006,” using similar language.47  Human Rights 
Watch advocate Saman Zarifi, speaking to the House International Relations Committee, 
referred to US-trained Ethiopian troops as “among the most abusive on the continent.”48  
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The Committee approved the act; however, the bill never went before the full House for a 
vote, possibly due to pressure on lawmakers by former House Majority Leaders Richard 
Armey and Richard Gephardt, at that time in the employ of lobbying firm DLI Piper.   
The firm, which the Ethiopian government had contracted at $50,000 per month 
for “strategic advice and counsel,”49 justified their actions using the “Global War on 
Terror,” and referring to Ethiopia as a “close ally today, particularly in the global war 
against terrorism. It is crucial for the United States to have friends and allies in the 
strategically important Horn of Africa region.”50  Following the Ethiopian invasion of 
Somalia, Smith tenaciously tried a third time, but with the same outcome.51  Before its 
last incarnation, he said: 
I believe that neither we nor the international community has pushed the 
Meles [Zenawi, the Prime Minister] government hard enough on human 
rights issues because we have been satisfied it cooperates with us to some 
extent in the war on terror.52 
 
US Representative Donald Payne (D-NJ) then introduced the “Ethiopia 
Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007.”  This bill prohibited “security assistance to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Ethiopia, with exceptions for peacekeeping, military education and training for civilian 
personnel, or counter-terrorism assistance.”  Additionally, the military education and 
training would not be used for “training to security personnel or units against whom there 
is credible evidence of gross human rights abuses or violations.”53  However, Senator Jim 
Inhofe (R-OK) headed efforts to defeat the measure, citing a now-familiar “at least they 
fight against terrorists” reasoning: 
[The bill] focuses only on shortcomings while blatantly ignoring the 
unprecedented progress the country has made…They continue to be a 
close friend of the United States and a strong ally in the War on Terror in 
the Horn of Africa.54 
 
The bill passed the House but was defeated in the Senate.   
Shortly thereafter, Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) introduced the “Support for 
Democracy and Human Rights in Ethiopia Act of 2008,” the text of which specifically 
indicated its origin in the post-election violence of 2005.  It was introduced on September 
9, 2008, just a month before AFRICOM became fully operational.  Recognizing the need 
to balance human rights, humanitarian, and regional security concerns, Feingold wrote, 
“Genuine democratic progress in Ethiopia is essential if we are to have a healthy and 
positive bilateral relationship. It is also essential if we are going to successfully combat 
extremism, thereby bolstering our own national security here at home.”  The bill would 
“prohibit United States funding to any unit of the Ethiopian security forces if there is 
credible evidence that a unit of the security forces has committed gross violations of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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human rights.”55  It was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, but died 
there before the end of the session. 
By 2010, the US had collected reports on Ethiopia’s human rights abuses by the 
UN Monitoring Group in Somalia, the Department of State, Freedom House, the EU 
Electoral Observer Mission, the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the NSC.56  In 
response, Senator Feingold re-introduced his 2008 bill in August 2010 as the “Support for 
Democracy and Human Rights in Ethiopia Act of 2010.” It prohibited military assistance 
unless: 
Ethiopia has taken steps to: (1) ensure the freedoms of civil society 
organizations to pursue work on civic education, democratization, human 
rights, and conflict resolution; (2) respect the rights of and permit 
nonviolent political parties to operate free from intimidation, including 
releasing imprisoned opposition political leader…(5) promote respect for 
human rights within its security forces, including investigating allegations 
of abuse.”57 
 
However, Feingold was defeated for re-election in 2010, and the bill has not come up 
again.58  As such, no military assistance has been withheld since 2005, though the total 
amount has decreased considerably since then.  Even more tellingly, the type of military 
assistance has changed considerably: 
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Table 2: US Military Aid to Ethiopia, 1990-201059 
 
 
While the total amount of funding increased after 9/11, for the most part 
(excepting a huge influx of aircraft parts in 2007) it decreased significantly after the 2005 
violence.  It is more notable that, starting with the 1998 invasion of Eritrea, IMET 
funding (which includes mandatory training in human rights and law of armed conflict) is 
the only program that has consistently increased; it started out as only 4% of the budget 
in 2005, but increased to 34% by 2010.  Lethal aid via FMF and FMS mostly decreased 
as the overall budget mostly decreased during that same period of time: FMF consistently 
decreased before being completely eliminated in 2010, and FMS fluctuated before being 
completely eliminated as a source of funding in 2011 and 2012 (not shown).  DOS notes 
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that, “some military training funds (to Ethiopia), including training in such issues as the 
laws of war and observance of human rights, also are provided but are explicitly limited 
to non-lethal assistance and training.”60  This ensures that the US is not party to human 
rights violations committed with the assistance it provides. 
DCS fluctuated after the violence, but except for the 2007 spike, never reached its 
2005 levels afterwards.  Because DCS is run by civilian companies, this may be a way for 
the US Government to stay engaged in Ethiopia (in recognition of its strategic location in 
the Horn of Africa and contribution to Peacekeeping Operations) while still being able to 
say that they are not (quite as) directly involved in supplying military assistance to 
repressive governments.  In effect, it puts some of the blame on the companies that sell 
the items, rather the US Government itself, giving the latter a measure of deniability. 
Analysis 
This chapter has come to three main findings: 
1. The US has withheld military aid from Ethiopia in the past as a result of 
human rights violations.  But it was used post facto, and not to prevent future 
violations.  The US took concrete, though limited, steps in withholding specific military 
assistance from Ethiopia as a result of Mengistu’s reign (1979-1991), the invasion of 
Eritrea (1998), post-election violence (2005), and the invasion of Somalia (2006).  
However, lawmakers unsuccessfully made efforts to enact pre-emptive legislation 
starting in 2005. 
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2. In response to previous aid being used to commit human rights violations, 
and in order to prevent it in the future, the US has shifted the type of military 
assistance away from lethal aid and towards non-lethal aid.  This allows the US to 
maintain a relationship with Ethiopia, while increasing the likelihood that it does not 
contribute to human rights violations.  This is indicative of policy affecting future 
programming. 
3. The military could do more, but unless civilian leadership enacts 
legislation withholding this aid, it is not going to happen.  Military assistance, one part 
of foreign aid in general, has long been used as a tool of government for foreign policy, 
including as a means to influence how a government views human rights.  But as a 
military unit subordinate to civilian leadership, Robert Moeller, former Deputy to the 
Commander for Military Operations in AFRICOM, notes: 
As a military organization, we do not create policy. Rather, we support 
those policy decisions and coordinate our actions closely with the State 
Department, U.S. embassies in the region, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), and other U.S. government agencies 
that have been trusted partners in Africa for decades.61 
 
Corollary to that, US military assistance to Ethiopia can serve as an example of programs 
driving policy: Congress has proven unable to created policies restricting military 
assistance programs to Ethiopia as a result of acts of repression against their own people.  
Instead, various funding programs have been decreased and, in the case of IMET, 
increased, in order to shift funding away from lethal (and potentially repressive) aid and 
towards non-lethal aid, to include education.   Hopefully the positive outcomes of this 
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program will empower Congress to create policies targeting regimes—even among our 
allies—that commit human rights abuses. 
It can be difficult to use military assistance as a tool of foreign policy when it is 
hamstrung in Congress by competing interests and overshadowed by arguments about 
national security concerns.  Policy makers must decide if a recipient of military 
assistance, frequently accused of human rights violations, can leverage a strategic 
relationship with the US in order to avoid penalties for these violations.  Thus far with 
Ethiopia, this seems to be the case.   
Conclusion 
Announcing the creation of AFRICOM in 2008, President George W. Bush 
predicted that it “will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of 
Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy and 
economic growth in Africa.”62  The US military, both before and after the creation of 
AFRICOM, has been actively involved in the affairs of numerous countries on the 
continent: those democratically inclined, as well as those clearly repressive.  But, as 
Ethiopia has demonstrated, it is possible to balance security considerations with human 
rights concerns through the use of military assistance.  And, while AFRICOM is ideally 
placed to implement US foreign policy with regards to human rights violations in Africa, 
Congress must be willing to enact legislation to restrict military assistance, if needed.   
Without question, it is strategically necessary to maintain a working relationship 
with Ethiopia; there are few areas of Africa more important than the Horn of Africa.  But !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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this relationship must not be maintained by turning a blind eye to its cost.  Human rights 
are a key component of nation building, and a critical, stated component of US foreign 
policy since the Carter Administration.  Security concerns are extremely important, but 
the US would be wise to heed Representative Chris Smith’s warning on the US’ 
relationship with Ethiopia: "We have to be careful that that old maxim — the enemy of 
my enemy is my friend — does not make us unwitting enablers of abuse.”63 
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CHAPTER SIX: SUDAN—CRAFTING A MILITARY ENGAGEMENT PLAN 
Introduction 
     "The foundation of United States, regional, and global security will 
remain America's relations with our allies, and our commitment to their 
security is unshakable. These relationships must be constantly cultivated, 
not just because they are indispensible for US interests and national 
security objectives, but because they are fundamental to our collective 
security." 
United National Security Strategy, May 20101 
 
On July 9, 2011, after a referendum vote earlier that year, South Sudan became 
the newest country in the world.  Amid post-independence fighting and on-going 
violence, the fledgling nation is struggling to establish itself on the world stage.  Larger 
nations concerned about vast oil reserves, Western nations preoccupied about terrorist 
groups, and others all have reason to be uneasy about how their own national interests 
may be affected by events there.  The United States is no exception. 
America has long been involved in the Great Lakes, East Africa, and Horn of 
Africa regions because of economic and security considerations, and an awareness of 
Africa’s importance became apparent when, in 2006, DOD created AFRICOM, its 
second overseas Unified Combatant Command since 1963.  Terrorist and extremist 
groups on the continent include Al-Qaeda in Sudan, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
in Central Africa, and al-Shabaab in Ethiopia.  The US Intelligence community continues !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to monitor for indicators of terror attacks like the 1998 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.  
And the instability associated with establishing a new nation can create seams that 
extremist groups can exploit to further their own strategic objectives.  Therefore, the US 
must make it a top priority to construct a comprehensive military engagement plan—one 
pillar of an overall engagement strategy—that welcomes the nascent state, builds a 
mutually beneficial relationship, and continues to further its objectives in this militarily 
and economically vital part of the world.   
But South Sudan lies astride several regions and issues that complicate efforts to 
simply shoehorn it into an existing policy.  Its Christian majority was a major source of 
the decades-long conflict with predominantly Muslim Sudan.  And while South Sudan 
has the support of black African nations to the south, both for solidarity reasons as well 
as the potential for oil wealth flowing through their states, Sudan has the support of Arab 
and Muslim North African and other Middle East nations, making larger regional 
alignments a further consideration for powers outside Africa.   
About 75% of the area’s oil is produced in South Sudan, while the infrastructure 
for refining it is located in Sudan.  Pipelines run north through both counties, and the type 
of petroleum produced there is in high demand by Asian nations.  This lends itself to 
proxy involvement and influence by nations such as China and Japan, who seek a reliable 
and affordable source of need-specific oil.2  And, the paparazzi-ready crises in Darfur and 
South Sudan have long garnered international attention, particularly among celebrity 
activists.  Needless to say, the implications of a failed security program are considerable. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This chapter seeks to identify the greatest challenges to South Sudan’s stability 
and find examples and best practices of current US military engagement that could 
address and mitigate these challenges.  It will then recommend an engagement plan using 
these programs.  This chapter will argue that, in order to craft the best engagement policy 
towards South Sudan, establish a mutually beneficial relationship, and do so in a timely 
manner, the US should use a combination of other engagement plans already used in the 
region.  Any efforts should be synchronized with those of US allies and international 
bodies, such as the UN, and take third-party actors such as NGOs into account to the 
maximum extent possible.  This can reduce inefficiencies and improve the speed of 
effective implementation, ultimately improving outcomes for South Sudanese more 
quickly.  However, starting from scratch or using a turnkey engagement plan from 
another country would be inefficient at best, and disastrous for the country it was 
designed to help at worst.  All effort should be made to avoid both. 
Where Does South Sudan Stand Now? 
South Sudan can trace the origin of conflict there to several sources.  One is that 
Sudan is predominantly Arab, while South Sudan is mostly non-Arab.  This is different 
from the commonly accepted “Muslim-Christian conflict” paradigm, because Sudan was 
not simply exploiting and attacking the primarily the black African, Christian, animist 
South.  It was rather continuing to exploit them as non-Arabs, along with Sudan’s 
“predominantly Muslim groups like the Darfuris in the west, the Bejas in the east, the 
Nubians in the north and the Nuba in Kordofan.”3  But whereas the other minority groups !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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had little in the way of natural resources that Khartoum could exploit, South Sudan 
contained oil wealth that, when taken by the north, provided a significant percentage of 
Sudan’s domestic exports revenues.4   
South Sudan, understandably opposed to the unremunerated extraction of natural 
resources located within its borders and seeing little hope for a better future, fought a 
nearly half-century civil war against Khartoum and its associated militia that left over 
two million dead and over four million displaced.5  Only with the internationally 
brokered Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 was there an attempt to 
definitely resolve a crisis in which one group largely wanted unity and the other equally 
wanted succession.  A successful referendum on independence was held in January 2011, 
and as a result, 
an estimated 3.8 million people, or 97.5% [of those registered], voted in 
the referendum, which was deemed peaceful and transparent by 
international observers.  According to the South Sudan Referendum 
Commission (SSRC), 98.8% voted for secession.6 
 
Unfortunately, 18 months after the referendum and a year after independence, the 
problems that resulted from decades of conflict and understandable mistrust still face 
South Sudan today.  Baker identifies the following contemporary sources of this mistrust:  
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• Oil-revenue sharing: The symbiotic nature of the oil industry in South Sudan 
(where most oil fields are located) and Sudan (where the refineries are located) 
necessitate an agreement on how to divide revenues. 
• Debt: Sanctions, loans, and excessive spending have saddled Sudan with a 
debt of $38.7 billion.  The question is how much of this debt should be assumed 
by South Sudan. 
• Abeyi: Formerly oil-rich, this border region is fertile ground for cattle-grazing 
nomads from both sides of the border, and a potential flashpoint. 
• Citizenship and migration: An issue for migratory pastoralists, this also 
concerns Christians from South Sudan living in the Muslim north, especially if 
President al-Bashir follows through on promises to enact Sharia law. 
• Returning refugees: Millions of refugees that fighting over five decades, and 
their rate of return could put unsustainable pressure on the fledgling government 
of South Sudan with regards to stress on institutions, natural resources, farmland, 
etc. 
• Infrastructure development: South Sudan may be “the least developed place 
on Earth,” and for the country to be able to achieve even basic developmental 
goals, it is necessary to focus on infrastructure development.7   
It is by addressing these issues that Sudan and South Sudan may be able to 
improve trust, and move forward with a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship, 
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7 Cheri Baker, South Sudan’s Enduring Secession Issue: Is Peace Possible?” The Applied 
Anthropologist 31, No. 2 (2011): 43-45. 
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rather than continue direct diplomatic confrontation, in addition to indirect, kinetic proxy 
involvement by militias.8 
Mitigating these problems will require extensive effort by the international 
community, such as material and diplomatic support, as well as pressure on the 
governments of both Khartoum and Juba.  There are also aspects of these issues that can 
be addressed and mitigated via a military engagement plan.  It is through this that the US 
military, with its extensive reach, unique skill sets, and significant resources can make a 
difference in the stability and security of South Sudan. 
What Do Military Engagement Plans Consist Of? 
In order to decide how best to implement a military engagement plan, it is 
necessary to identify the components of such an engagement, identify successful regional 
examples, and apply those examples to South Sudan.  Although there are many aspects of 
military engagement, this chapter will focus on three most necessary for the challenges 
that South Sudan faces: 
• Training programs and professionalization of the military 
• Anti-terrorism/Counter-terrorism programs 
• Infrastructure Development 
In none of the countries where any of these programs are currently implemented 
by the US military are all of these programs implemented with the same levels of 
efficiency of effectiveness.  As a result, the US should not look to a single country as a 
template for engagement.  One should note that none of the programs is without 
controversy either; there is no place in the world where the US military is engaged where !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Strategy Page. 
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there is not criticism.  But by looking across all military domains in order to build a 
turnkey program of engagement, it may be possible to create what is best for South 
Sudan, while still supporting US interests in the region, without “reinventing the wheel” 
at a higher cost, using increased resources, with slower implementation. 
Training Programs and the Professionalization of the Military 
South Sudan had a standing army, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA), for years before it gained its independence.  The SPLA was, for the most part, a 
legitimate force by the four criteria set forth by the Hague Regulations in 1899.9  
However, the US has the ability to provide training to the SPLA that can make it a more 
effective military, more respectful of human rights and the law of war, result in more 
stability, and allow long-term influence by the US, to the benefit of both. 
Effective Military 
Foreign officers who attend middle and upper-level staff colleges in the US, such 
as the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, are 
exposed to the same level of training as senior officers in the American military who will 
soon command battalions, brigades, and divisions.  Because of the limited number of 
seats available at these schools, only a nation’s best and brightest are chosen, as they are 
frequently being groomed for higher positions.  Colonel John Burbank, program director 
for the US Army War College’s International Fellows (IF) program said: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 “1) To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 2) To have a fixed 
distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 3) To carry arms openly; and 4) To conduct their 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”  It is the last point that would take 
away from their legitimacy, but few armies fight without some incidents that would call this into 
question.  For more, see International Committee of the Red Cross, “Practice Relating to Rule 4. 
Definition of Armed Forces,” http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule4 (accessed 
July 25, 2012). 
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Well over half of our IF class will become general officers in their nation's 
armed forces or are currently general officers right now.  A significant 
number will become Army Chief of Staff, or Chairman Joint Chiefs of 
Staff equivalents.10 
 
The collegial relationship between senior officers, and the prestige that attending 
such a program bestows on foreign exchange officers affords a credibility—both within 
their own armies and with partner nations—lacking in armies without this level of 
training.  This can also facilitate stronger regional partnerships as a result of the shared 
experiences.11  A total of 112 nations have sent some 1053 officers to the Army War 
College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania since 1978,12 and there are currently 12 
African countries represented in the 2013 class, though neither Sudan nor South Sudan 
have students in attendance.  This is a gap that can be addressed immediately to the 
benefit of the military in Juba. 
Human Rights 
In a civil war characterized by war crimes on both sides of the fight, in order for 
the SPLA to gain and retain legitimacy in the eyes of the world, there must be an 
institutionalization of human rights and respect for law.  This is especially true if human 
rights violations continue by Sudan and the threat of destabilization through retaliation 
remains.  The US military is prohibited by the Leahy Amendment from proving any !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Thomas Zimmerman, “International Fellows Start Army War College Year,” Army War 
College Community Banner, July 19, 2012, 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/banner/article.cfm?id=2594 (accessed July 25, 2012). 
11 Author’s conversation with COL John Burbank, Director, International Fellows Program, US 
Army War College, July 30, 2012. 
12 US Army War College, “International Fellows Program,” 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/InternationalFellows/Sponsorship.cfm (accessed July 25, 
2012). 
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training, whether overseas or at American bases stateside, to countries, military units, or 
individuals that stand accused of human rights violations, but the US can engage those 
with a clean record to provide this valuable training.13  The UN has already established 
some training programs in South Sudan focused on human rights,14 and the US has, in the 
past, instituted rigorous human rights training program into existing military schools.  
This came into place after graduates of the US Army’s Western Hemisphere Institute for 
Security Cooperation (WHINSEC, formerly the School of the Americas), from several 
Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s, were accused of human rights 
violations upon returning to their home countries.15  As long as the US holds South Sudan 
accountable for human rights violations,16 makes military aid contingent on a more 
positive human rights record,17 and provides the opportunity for South Sudanese officers 
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13 US Department of State, “An Overview of the Leahy Vetting Process,” May 14, 2012, 
http://www.humanrights.gov/2011/10/06/an-overview-of-the-leahy-vetting-process/ (accessed 
July 25, 2012). 
14 UN News Centre, “South Sudan Army Officers Receive UN-Led Human Rights Training,”  
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41427&Cr=South (accessed July 25, 2012). 
15 Anup Shah, “Training Human Rights Violators,” Global Issues, Oct 30, 2001, 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/76/training-human-rights-violators (accessed July 26, 2012). 
16 Sudan Tribune, “US Report Accuses South Sudan Of Human Rights Abuse, Corruption,” May 
28, 2012, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/US-report-accuses-S-Sudan-of-human,42724 (accessed July 26, 
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Rights Abuses,” June 6, 2012, 
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to attend human rights training, there may be the possibility to improve human rights 
outcomes from the start. 
Increased Stability 
Any training program should stress subordination to civilian authority and the 
proper importance of civil-military relations, in the image of a Western liberal democracy 
like the United States.  This could cause a break from the norm in Africa of a military 
that is a powerbroker, kingmaker, or destabilizing force.  Channeling Kant, this approach 
to stability seeks “solutions to conflict and issues of governance through...applications of 
moral conduct and law.”  Thus, Neo-Kantians “see a ‘world of progress’ and seek 
solutions through the application/evolution of liberal democracies.”18  If the West is truly 
hoping for a liberal democracy to develop in South Sudan, and given Africa’s history of 
coups d’état, then institutionalizing the ideas of subordination to civilian authorities and 
adherence to rule of law for the military should be an important first step.  Fukuyama 
noted, “political ideas, along with their associated values and belief systems, play critical 
roles in determining the future.”19  Given South Sudan’s shaky start, it is an idea that 
must take root if the future is to be brighter. 
Long-Term Influence  
Providing training to junior and mid-career officers also allows for an appropriate 
influence over these officers once they return to their home country.  The Egyptian 
military’s behind-the-scenes role as a power broker has been proffered as a reason why 
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18 Peter VanArsdale and Derrin Smith, Humanitarians in Hostile Territory (Walnut Creek: Left 
Coast Press, 2010), 79-80. 
19 Ibid, 80. 
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they did not intervene during the Arab Spring in 2011.  However, as Assistant Secretary 
of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman stated, International Military Exchange 
Training (IMET) to Egypt “was invaluable in maintaining our relationships with Egypt’s 
military and civil society during the recent events there.”20  As such, there is also the 
possibility that the significant cadre of military personnel trained by the US—some 4,200 
total—contributed to the restraint and professionalism they showed.21  More broadly, the 
connections made between US military officers and foreign officers such as those from 
African can, through continued interaction after leaving an academic setting, “prevent 
security vacuums in the region and promote a reliable element of stability for regional 
populaces.”22  For the population in South Sudan, this would be a stability that has been 
lacking for decades. 
There have only been five Sudanese military officers who have benefitted from 
training by the United States, but the last one attended in 1990.23  If the US is able to 
ramp up its exchange programs with the new cohort of South Sudanese officers, it will be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Jeffrey D. Feltman, Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 10, 2010, 
www.hcfa.house.gov/112/65055.pdf (accessed July 24, 2012). 
21 Daniel Darling, “How Much Influence Does $1.3 Billion Buy the US with Egypt’s Military?” 
The Faster Times, February 4, 2011, 
http://www.thefastertimes.com/defensespending/2011/02/04/how-much-influence-does-1-3-
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22 Kenneth Mckenzie and Elizabeth Packard, “Enduring Interests and Partnerships: Military-to-
Military Relationships in the Arab Spring,” Prism 3, no. 1 (December 2011), 104.  Available at 
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/prism3-1/prism_99-106_mckenzie-packard.pdf (accessed July 
25, 2012). 
23 Author’s conversation with COL John Burbank, Director, International Fellows Program, US 
Army War College, July 30, 2012. 
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able to develop a network, a cadre of officers, which the US may be able to appropriately 
influence during times of crisis, and later as they rise to positions of power in the military 
and government, towards continued positive outcomes in the future. 
Anti-Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism (AT/CT) Programs 
The three major terrorist groups operating in Africa are Boko Haram (Nigeria), al-
Shabaab (Somalia), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.  General Carter Ham, the 
Commander of AFRICOM, said, “Each of these organizations is, by itself, a dangerous 
and worrisome threat.  But what really concerns me is that the three organizations are 
seeking to coordinate and synchronize their efforts.”24  Obviously, a concerted effort by 
Muslim extremists with the Khartoum-backed militias such as the South Sudanese 
Liberation Army (SSLA) could contribute to greater destabilization of its southern 
neighbor.25  There is also potential for more involvement for groups not traditionally 
associated with the region.  Speaking about alleged Iranian involvement in the area, 
“Israel's ambassador to the UN said that Israel was worried that West Africa had become 
a hub for Hezbollah, Lebanon's fiercely anti-Israeli, Iranian-backed party-cum-militia.”26  
However, existing programs on the African continent demonstrate best practices for 
crafting an anti-terrorism/counter-terrorism engagement plan for South Sudan. 
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25 Relief Web, “South Sudan Liberation Movement Press Announcement,” January 31, 2000, 
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In Kenya, the US State Department-run Anti-Terrorism Agency (ATA) has 
provided over $3.2 million towards training efforts, including courses such as Preventing, 
Investigating and Interdicting Acts of Terrorism (PIIAT), Cyber-Terrorism Instruction, 
Combating Domestic and Transnational Terrorism, and Police Executive Role in 
Combating Terrorism.27  Most importantly, although some of the training in border 
protection has focused on Kenya’s extensive shoreline, there has also been significant 
effort to help the government in Nairobi strengthen its land borders, sharing a frontier as 
it does with Somalia.28  This may help alleviate concerns in South Sudan where the 
porous and disputed border region it shares with Sudan has been the source of much of 
the violence.   
More widely, the US has contributed to AT/CT through regional organizations 
hosting training and other programmatic initiatives.  The Trans-Sahel region, where al-
Qaeda and other Islamic extremist forces are suspected of basing their operations, has 
been the focus of this as the US military has extensive training operations in AT/CT.  
Started in 2005, “the initiative, with proposed funding of $500 million over seven years, 
covers Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia.”29 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 US Department of State, “The Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program,” 2005, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/89959.pdf (accessed July 24, 2012). 
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There are 13 other multi-national operations held on the continent, including 
Operations “Flintlock” and “Cutlass Express.”  These two exercises provide training by 
US and European Special Operations Forces (SOF), who specialize in AT/CT, to their 
African counterparts for whom the risk of terrorist attacks are very real.30  Inviting South 
Sudan to participate in these exercises would not only expose their tactical and 
operational unit-level officers to their colleagues from the Trans-Sahel region, but also 
facilitate the sharing of information, building relationships, and communicating best 
practices in anti-terrorism/counter-terrorism operations. 
Infrastructure Development 
Decades of fighting left South Sudan with only a shell of the infrastructure it 
needs to support its population of 10 million, including a mere 60km of roads in a 
country the size of Texas, and electricity provided almost exclusively by generator.31  
Where a government has not been able to provide for basic needs and services, terror 
groups such as al-Qaeda and the FARC in Columbia have been able to make inroads; 
focusing on infrastructure and capacity development and reducing inequality is necessary 
for any government—of any age—to reduce the influence of extremists.32 
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The US has significantly increased the use of Civil Affairs (CA) teams around the 
world, and in Africa in particular, as a means of doing just that.  CA teams bring 
specialized skill sets to key cities, regions, or countries in order to address the problems 
unique to each of them.  Some examples include Veterinary Civic Action Projects (VET-
CAPs) in Tanzania, Key Leader Engagements (KLEs) in Djibouti, and Medical Outreach 
Programs in Mali.33  South Sudan faces significant problems with water rights and 
nomadic grazing, refugees and displaced persons camps, road infrastructure, among 
others.  The use of CA teams can help mitigate these problems. 
Water rights and the nomadic grazing that they support are also a source of 
conflict and suffering in South Sudan.  Water and pasture resources are extremely limited 
for both the Sudanese-backed (and armed) Muslim Misseriya and South Sudanese backed 
Dinka tribes that traditionally graze their livestock near the border.34  Concurrently, 
decades of fighting have disrupted the harvest cycle, forcing rival tribes to concentrate in 
some of the same areas, therefore vying for the few resources available to them.  This has 
resulted in severe fighting, deaths, and pushed thousands of refugees from provinces like 
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile into already over-burdened camps.35   
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Exacerbating the violence are retaliatory raids for both cattle and women, which 
only fuel competition and conflict in both populations.36  Civil Affairs teams could be 
used to help drill wells and access other sources of water, as has already been done in 
Ethiopia37 and Uganda.38  By making sufficient water sources available to both groups, it 
could facilitate increased agricultural and herding outcomes.  Additionally, the CA teams 
may be able to help develop agricultural projects, increasing productivity and output, and 
driving down prices.39  This may result in more stability, decreased fighting, fewer 
refugees, and greater health outcomes. 
Refugees are an enormous problem in South Sudan today, with ongoing fighting 
regularly displacing hundreds of thousands of people.   
Clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement-North have driven thousands of residents of South 
Kordofan across the border...Similar attacks are also ongoing in Blue Nile, 
driving over 113,000 people from their homes and into South Sudan’s 
Upper Nile state.40 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Relief Web, “EU boosts humanitarian aid for needs in Sudan and South Sudan by !40 million,” 
July 26, 2012, http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan-republic/eu-boosts-humanitarian-aid-needs-
sudan-and-south-sudan-%E2%82%AC40-million (accessed July 27, 2012). 
37 Timothy Wilson, “Navy Seabees, Army Civil Affairs Bring Water to Dire Dawa,” Defense 
Video and Imagery Distribution System, http://www.dvidshub.net/news/74325/navy-seabees-
army-civil-affairs-bring-water-dire-dawa#.UBLJiWmXSIU (accessed July 27, 2012). 
38 United States Virtual Presence Post: Northern Uganda, “Civil Affairs Provides Humanitarian 
Assistance,” US Department of State, http://northernuganda.usvpp.gov/uganda_story.html 
(accessed August 2, 2012). 
39 Felix Fimbres, “Civil Affairs Teams Get Dirty to Learn New Ways to Help Afghans,” US 
Army, 
http://www.army.mil/article/73151/Civil_Affairs_team_gets_dirty_to_learn_new_ways_to_help_
Afghans/ (accessed July 27, 2012). 
40 Nelson. 
! 129!
With existing camps swelling well beyond capacity, the strain on sanitation, aid 
flow, and camp infrastructure can result in disease, starvation, and death.  But CA teams 
elsewhere have a background in establishing and expanding refugee camps to a 
sustainable level until the host country government can take control or the situation is 
resolved.  In March 1991, Civil Affairs teams helped work with almost 500,000 Kurdish 
refugees in the wake of Operation Desert Storm, later called “the largest humanitarian 
assistance operation since the Berlin Airlift.”41  Other examples include Haiti42 and more 
recently, Kosovo.43 
Finally, road infrastructure must be strengthened in South Sudan.  The 
government in Juba has already repaired 7,000 kilometers of roads since 2005, and built 
another 2,000 kilometers of “feeder roads” to bring agricultural areas into the network.  
Additionally, South Sudan has plans in the works for an extensive, 192-kilometer road 
system, linking the country to Uganda; the project will be funded by $225 million from 
the US Agency for International Development (USAID).44  Civil Affairs teams can assist 
in this effort by helping smaller rural areas link to the rapidly developing road network so 
they can access aid and trade.  Over 80% of the South Sudanese population lives in rural !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), “USACAPOC(A) 
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areas, and 78% rely on small-scale farming or animal husbandry as their main 
livelihood.45  A 2001 study by the World Bank indicated that benefits of access to road 
networks to rural areas included: 
• “Improved accessibility to social infrastructure [schools and health centers]; 
• Increased opportunities to access education and health facilities and improved 
social interaction and mobility, which are important for social and economic 
development;  
• Improved access to markets by reducing transport costs;  
• Improvement of the marketability of perishable goods through timely and 
cheaper transport that will provide a direct incentive for more market-oriented 
agriculture, with more profitable cash crops, an increase in rural income and also 
additional employment opportunities.”46 
If the above improvements are realized, it could prevent the population from 
becoming disaffected and disenfranchised, the very situations that extremist groups seek 
when recruiting members.  And, by working with Civil Affairs teams, the government in 
Juba could gain legitimacy and credibility with the local population as in some places in 
Afghanistan: “The (Civil Affairs unit) fronts the money, provided by U.S. taxpayers; U.S. 
civilian engineers...draw up the plans; local contractors do the work; and the Afghan 
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government takes the credit.”47  For a fledgling state like South Sudan, as well as any 
nation seeking to work with it, it should be a very viable option. 
Unfortunately, it is not just physical infrastructure that is in shambles in South 
Sudan, but also public administration.  There can also be a dearth of timely information 
necessary for follow-on diplomatic and development efforts.  To address these gaps, 
another potential asset could be what VanArsdale and Smith have referred to as 
“Diplomatic Expeditionary Field Teams” (DEFTs).48  Evolved from existing Human 
Terrain Teams (HTTs) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), DEFTs would 
serve as a “force multiplier” much in the same way as CA teams, albeit with a diplomatic 
orientation.   
While some areas would welcome teams of military personnel, others may 
associate them with the violence of the civil war; in this case, DEFTs may have an 
advantage precisely because they are not military.  Additionally, the number of requests 
that locals make of CA teams might result in frustration at the amount of time necessary 
to complete them.  But DEFTs, able to move more quickly as they gather data, could help 
vet projects, increasing the efficiency of the CA teams.  Finally, as personnel with 
diplomatic status, meeting with local stakeholders “would provide an added measure of 
official credibility to projects requested by local populations an regional authorities.”49  
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While this “grassroots diplomacy” may not show the same immediate effects as drilling a 
well or grading a road, the seeds planted by DEFTs will undoubtedly pay notable 
dividends in establishing a more effective public administration in South Sudan. 
Spoilers 
There are no shortage of spoilers to a properly crafted military engagement plan 
between the US and South Sudan, and those who stand to benefit from an unstable 
government in Juba (or wherever the capital ends up).50  Not the least are those in 
Khartoum, as this would keep the South Sudanese dependent on them for the export of 
petroleum.  A stable government there would allow the new nation to establish export 
infrastructure and establish stronger economic ties and with other, more friendly African 
neighbors to the south, namely Kenya and Uganda.  A recent report noted:  
Already, Kenyan-owned Equity Bank has negotiated with the government 
of South Sudan its interest in oil development, and numerous foreign 
investment institutions have explored using Kenyan banks as 
intermediaries for ventures in South Sudan. In addition, Kenyan leaders 
envision prime markets for Kenyan exports in South Sudan.51 
 
Sudan will have to carefully consider the consequences of a continued strong-armed 
approach to South Sudanese oil.  Bully Juba too much, and she may exclusively seek 
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petroleum export infrastructure with Kenya and Uganda.  This will greatly decrease 
Sudan’s own coffers, as 50% of domestic revenue and 93% of exports come from oil.52 
Israel was one of the first countries to recognize South Sudan after independence.  
In January 2012 South Sudan shut down production of petroleum over price disputes.  
The dispute was not clarified until July 2012.  Juba then signed an agreement with Israel 
covering mostly water issues (some reports state that there are also arms deals involved), 
however “the new agreement with Israel could potentially allow South Sudan to transfer 
its oil to Israeli refineries.”53  As Iran has sided with Khartoum—“where the government 
promised to strengthen economic ties, oil exploration included”—this could also be a 
source of both tension and proxy conflict between two countries seen concurrently as a 
US ally and a threat.54 
Conclusion 
There is no lack of potential pitfalls in forming a military engagement plan with 
any country, such as when China and the US frequently clash over the sale of arms to 
Pacific Rim countries.55  Like any aspect of foreign policy, military engagement must !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Global Witness, “Crude Calculations: The Continued Lack of Transparency Over Oil in 
Sudan,” January 2011, 
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/110104_Crude%20Calculations_0.pdf"!24, 
(accessed July 27, 2012). 
53 All Africa, “South Sudan Signs Economic Agreement With Israel On 'Water, Technology’, ” 
July 26, 2012,  
http://allafrica.com/stories/201207271055.html (accessed July 27, 2012). 
54 The Economist, “The Sudans; A Playground for Proxies,” Jun 16, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21556984 (accessed July 27, 2012). 
55 Agence France-Presse, “China Criticizes U.S. Vote on Taiwan Fighter Sales,” May 21, 2012, 
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120521/DEFREG03/305210007/China-Criticizes-U-S-
Vote-Taiwan-Fighter-Sales (accessed July 25, 2012). 
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take into account not only the immediate benefits, but also calculate the medium— and 
long—term effects, its impact on immediate and regional neighbors, and other 
unintended consequences.  Competitors can view a particular aspect of engagement as a 
direct or indirect threat, while allies may demonstrate a type of “engagement envy.”56  
These considerations must be foremost in the mind of civil and military planners as they 
continue to develop the nascent relationship with South Sudan. 
However, there are sufficient examples of successful military engagement plans 
today that it need not be crafted from scratch.  By pulling together applicable aspects of 
engagement, it may be possible to create an effective, comprehensive, and timely (which 
is not to say rushed) military engagement plan that contributes to stability in South Sudan 
and the surrounding region, benefits the US and her allies, and does not heighten existing 
tensions with Sudan or others working in the region.  This chapter has demonstrated that 
the US can develop a strategy that provides training in institutionalization of human 
rights and respect for law (though not discussed in detail), resources for anti-
terrorism/counter-terrorism programs, and assistance in infrastructure and capacity 
development, all based on “best practices” culled from existing programs.  It is with such 
as comprehensive military engagement plan—one pillar of an overall engagement 
strategy—that the US can welcome the nascent state, build a mutually beneficial 
relationship, and continue to further its objectives in this militarily and economically vital 
part of the world.    
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Kenneth Stein, “Egyptian-Israeli Relations,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 1: No. 
3 (Sept 1997), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue3/jv1n3a5.html (accessed July 25, 2012). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
Part One of this thesis has argued that benevolent dictatorships and autocratic 
elites can provide for improved state capacity, by measuring the performance of African 
states.  In the first chapter, it examined Rwanda to establish whether or not the country 
was actually “working,” as well as if this performance could be attributed to the post-
conflict government of President Paul Kagame.  It also examined how the US 
Government, in supporting one side in a conflict and despite the potential civil and 
human rights abuses, can possibly prevent a civil war, or at least limit the tragedies 
associated with it.   
This thesis then explored the process by which autocracies can facilitate positive 
outcomes and contribute to improved state capacity by looking at the cases of Ethiopia 
and Somalia.  It also measured how these dictatorships develop state capacity to provide 
for justice and citizen well-being.  Next, it proposed unconventional metrics by which the 
Democratic Republic of Congo—arguably one of the worst performing countries on the 
planet in many categories—may be assessed.  It identified modest success stories that can 
be attributed to the Kabila regime, and prospective sources of improvements with regards 
to resource management.  These could then be used to drive state capacity and bring up 
other performance indicators. 
The first section is not the centerpiece of the study, but rather forms the basis 
upon which a holistic, informed military engagement plan could be crafted.  This thesis 
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assumes that the US—particularly in a post-conflict environment—will not always have 
the privilege of engaging a country with the government that it wants, but rather will find 
itself engaging the government that the country has.  As such, knowing the most effective 
way to engage an existing system—autocratic warts and all—has obvious benefits. 
Part Two thus builds on the findings of the previous section and looks at how the 
US Government could leverage military engagement plans in order to facilitate more 
positive outcomes.  A chapter examining programs in Ethiopia looked at attempts to 
leverage assistance to shape outcomes by repressive elites.  And a final chapter used the 
example of South Sudan to make several programmatic recommendations for military 
planners about how to craft military engagement plans with African nations, even if they 
are not fully democratic. 
Critics will undoubtedly voice concerns with a number of aspects of this 
approach, such as the limited number of case studies involved before drawing a 
conclusion.  Admittedly, none of the results of the country studies presented here are 
sufficient to merit an across-the-board application in Africa.  Each of the examples given 
is a single case study and neither fit the criteria for Eckstein’s “crucial case study” 
(1975), nor Gerring’s “pathway case” (2007).  For Eckstein, “a case is crucial in the 
strongest sense when...no other theory can explain the facts of that case;” a situation 
which he admits rarely applies.  The “pathway case” serves “not to confirm or disconfirm 
a causal hypothesis...but rather to clarify a hypothesis;” in this case, the hypothesis must 
already be well established.  The case studies here most closely resemble Eckstein’s 
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“most likely” corollary to the crucial case study, and are most valuable for our purposes 
as such.1 
Due to space constraints, I have limited the scope of the study to simply US 
engagement plans in reaction to the findings.  As such, it does not address the impact that 
input from countries outside the US—namely China—would likely have on policy 
makers’ decisions.  Nor does it attempt to examine the question of how and when the US 
should get involved in the affairs of other nations within the context of a multi-national 
approach (such as through the UN or AU).  In a real-world case, the US would likely 
couch its approach within a larger construct (such as the UN or NATO), but this is a 
matter for subsequent research.  But the current length of this thesis, given its US-only 
construct, should indicate the volume necessary to include more stakeholders in an 
analysis.   
There are limited examples of benevolent dictatorships (albeit numerous façade 
democracies, with a dearth of legitimate elections, and ineffective or non-existent 
opposition), which brings into question the generalizability of the findings herein.  It 
saves for later the topic of why elites would chose to be benevolent rather than predatory.  
Additionally, it does not address how the US can predict the level of benevolence a 
dictator will demonstrate, only that, because many countries in Africa are less than fully 
democratic, it is useful to examine how to best engage them.  Finally, there is always the 
challenge of measuring how benevolent a dictator is, or if one is “benevolent enough.”  
This paper does not seek to endorse authoritarian, repressive governments, but it does !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For more, see John Gerring, “Is There a Viable Crucial-Case Method?” Comparative Political 
Studies 40, no. 3 (March 2007), http://sws.bu.edu/jgerring/documents/CrucialCaseCPS.pdf 
(accessed May 18, 2012). 
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find that when they use their powers for some greater good such as state capacity 
building, and not purely for the sake of wielding power, a benevolent dictatorship can 
indeed facilitate positive outcomes and great state capacity. 
Individual cases also seem to present flaws.  Few autocrats—by definition—are 
going to be fully benevolent, and the 1994 Genocide may have provided such a shock to 
the collective systems of Rwandans that Kagame’s approach to governing has worked 
there where it might not in the absence of a similar impetus.  Ethiopia serves as a proxy 
for countries in Africa that have vast reserves of natural resources but, unfortunately, also 
a government with elites that are more repressive and less benevolent.  As such, these 
reserves are not leveraged for the people, and the potential for improvement is lost.  The 
chapter on Somalia hypothesizes that only a true dictator may be strong enough to 
overcome the fundamental but ultimately destabilizing role of the clan system.  
Academics and pedestrians alike can argue for which is worse: the current failed state of 
the country and accompanying decades of violence, or a dictatorship like that of Siad 
Barre.   
The DRC’s past experiences with natural resources—indeed, the history of 
conflict there is inextricably linked to conflict minerals—does not seem to support the 
theory presented here that embryonic success in the areas of mining, timber, and wildlife 
programs can be leveraged towards more positive outcomes.  But if Kabila’s government 
is making some progress, with the potential for more, it would be a lost opportunity to not 
take advantage of this in order to develop the state’s capacity. 
With regards to what can be done with this insight, critics will point out that even 
after evidence of human rights abuses emerged, America’s post-9/11 world-view eroded 
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her political resolve to restrict the flow of military aid to Ethiopia.  However, this paper 
found that despite weakened legislative support, the US Departments of State and 
Defense found a way to effectively shift the nature of this aid, which may have a positive 
effect on abuses in the long term.  This undoubtedly sends mixed signals to other 
countries about what the US is willing to tolerate in its partners.  But it won’t make 
abuses any worse, and some countries will undoubtedly receive the message that there 
will be some price for such violations. 
Finally, South Sudan, not unlike Rwanda after the Genocide, may present a set of 
circumstances that are truly unique and might facilitate a successful military engagement 
plan.  The problem arises when the circumstances are so unique that they do not apply 
elsewhere.  However, while South Sudan presents an opportunity as a new nation with a 
proverbial blank slate, conceptually the principles remain the same: there can be no 
boiler-plate solution when the US is deciding how to interact with another country.  This 
is particularly true with regards to military engagement in Africa, given the prevalence of 
military-led coups d’état and military governments there.2  Stability can come from a 
professional military subordinate to a civilian government and accountable for its actions, 
but history does not seem to indicate that this type of government will develop 
organically. 
 More relevant than a criticism of the overall approach I have proposed is the 
general concept contained herein: standard metrics of performance only seem to indicate 
that things in Africa continue to go poorly, and the ways that the West and others have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Monty and Donna Marshall, “Coups d’État: 1946-2010,” Center for Systemic Peace, June 15, 
2011, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm (accessed October 9, 2012).!
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approached “solving” problems in Africa as a result do not seem to have worked.  As 
such, it is necessary to find other ways to assess the performance of countries in Africa, 
to validate whether this is truly the case or not.  If the situation there really is that bad, 
then the approach needs to be changed regardless, lest they continue to practice Einstein’s 
misattributed definition of insanity.3  However, if it is not the case, and there are other 
performance metrics which seem to indicate state capacities are better developed than 
previously assumed, it may be possible for outside actors to capitalize on these and 
leverage them towards more positive outcomes.  The consequences for failing to do so 
are dire, yet unfortunately, not unexpected: “As state capacity erodes and weaker states 
emerge, the propensity for insecurity within and across African states intensifies, leading 
to serious challenges for maintaining peace.”4 
Few people who study Africa doubt its potential.  A recent McKinsey & 
Company white paper reported several findings that others have touched on or predicted 
for years: 
•  Africa's growth acceleration was widespread, with 27 of its 30 largest 
economies expanding more rapidly after 2000. 
•  Future economic growth will be supported by Africa's increasing ties to the 
global economy. 
•  Africa's economic growth is creating substantial new business opportunities 
that are often overlooked by global companies. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” 
4 P. Brian Bartels, “HIV/AIDS, State Capacity, and Security in Africa,” Presented at the 
Workshop and Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University Mini Conference (May 2 
and 5, 2003), 5. 
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•  Today the rate of return on foreign investment in Africa is higher than in any 
other developing region.5 
But it is not just in economic realms that Africa shows potential.  In governance, 
the Ibrahim Index found that “Just over half of the countries in Africa have improved in 
overall governance quality, and just under half have declined,” a statement that on the 
surface, is not one to celebrate.  But as a subset of this figure, 48 countries made 
improvements to “Human Development,” and 38 countries made improvements to 
“Sustainable Economic Opportunity.”6  If a benevolent or well-intentioned government 
does not provide for full freedom and liberty, but facilitates improvements in the lives of 
everyday citizens, that may indeed be an improvement that can be continued with 
enlightened intervention. 
 Africa has failed to enjoy the same level of development as other poverty-stricken 
regions of the world.7  It would seem that a continent with such gross amounts of natural 
resources—not to mention much strategically vital geography—would be able to leverage 
both to achieve even greater gains than countries like China and India did in the 1980s.  
But this has clearly not been the case, and a serious effort towards improving the daily !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5  Charles Roxburgh et al, “Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African 
Economies,” McKinsey Global Institute, June 2010, 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/productivity_competitiveness_and_growth/lions
_on_the_move (accessed October 9, 2012). 
6 It is also noteworthy that the Mo Ibrahim Foundation has elected to not award their prize for the 
4th year in a row.  For more see Mo Ibrahim Foundation, “2011 Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance: Summary,” October 2011, 
http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/media/get/20111003_ENG2011-IIAG-SummaryReport-
sml.pdf,8 (accessed October 9, 2012). 
7 United Nations, “International Human Development Indicators,” November 2, 2011), 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (accessed October 9, 2012). 
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lives of Africans must take a different tack than previous ones.  As the World Bank 
wrote, “If Africa is to have a well-functioning public sector there needs to be a paradigm 
shift in how to analyze and build state capacity.”8  By doing so, it may finally be possible 
to identify new methodologies and avenues for assessing and subsequently improving the 
situation in Africa.  Donors and benefactors deserve better from the execution of the 
efforts they support and resources they provide; for Africans, their situation could hardly 
get much worse. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 World Bank, “Building State Capacity For Good Governance In Africa Requires A Paradigm 
Shift,” Emerging Markets, http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/1017344/Building-State-
Capacity-For-Good-Governance-In-Africa-Requires-A-Paradigm-Shift.html (accessed October 
31, 2012). 
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Appendix A 
Key Variables 
Stability: “Stability” is defined as a continuity of governance at all levels, with 
little “likelihood that the established government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism.”1  Put more simply, there will be no “unscheduled” changes of 
government, and that when it is time for a ruling party to depart, as dictated by 
elections, constitutional mandate, or other means, they will do so peacefully. 
Security: “Security” is defined as having limited threats, both domestically and 
externally, to Rwandan citizens’ physical welfare (the most important immediate 
need for Rwandans—or anyone in these circumstances—in the wake of the Civil 
War and Genocide).  While they sound similar, “stability” addresses attempts at 
destabilizing or overthrowing the government, while “security” addresses various 
attempts targeting the people of that country. 
Improved Welfare: Initially less pressing than security concerns, but as important 
or perhaps more so in the long run, “improved welfare” is defined by the other, 
more abstract issues a nation needs to address for its people to believe that things 
are getting better.  This includes the metrics that can be hardest to measure 
(improvements to education and health, expanding freedom of press), but that 
conceptually capture if life is improving. 
Key Operational Definitions  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 World Bank, “Political Violence,” http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/pv.pdf 
(accessed October 20, 2011).  
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“Dictatorship”: I will be using the definition of Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski in their 1965 classic, Totalitarianism, Dictatorship, and Autocracy.  In 
it, a dictatorship is “taken as a mutually supportive organic entity” that is made up 
of the following: “an elaborating guiding ideology; a single mass party, typically 
led by a dictator; a system of terror; a monopoly of the means of communication 
and physical force; and central direction, and control of the economy through 
state planning.”2 
 One component of this “system of terror,” which includes all the means 
and methods a dictator uses to create fear, is a carefully scripted and thoroughly 
executed “culture of terror.”  This is frequently accomplished by creating “parallel 
security systems,” outside the normal “chain of command” and loyal and 
answerable to the dictator himself.  In Malawi, Dr. Hastings Banda created 
institutions such as the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Malawi Young 
Pioneers (MYP), the Women’s League, and others allowing him to serve as 
“President for Life” from 1961-1994.3  It can also happen when a dictator 
eliminates any opposition, especially if he perceives it emanating from within the 
groups that helped him come to power.  After all, if one were willing to remove 
those who supported your ascent, what would one not be willing to do to stay in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!#$%&'(!)$*%+,-!./'%$0&%$,&$(!1'2+,(3+(%-4!5%%6788999:($%&'(3$*%+,:;'38+(;<;0'6+=&$8/'%$0&%$,&$(>?'2+,(3+(%!@$;;+**+=!#'2+3A+,!B-!"CD"E:!
3 Wiseman Chijere Chirwa, “Dancing towards Dictatorship: Political Songs and Popular 
Culture in Malawi,” Nordic Journal of African Studies 10, no. 1 (2001) http://www.njas. 
helsinki.fi/pdf-files/vol10num1/chirwa.pdf, (accessed December 17, 2011). 
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power?  It is the institutionalization of this fear or terror that largely differentiates 
dictators from benevolent dictators. 
“Benevolent Dictatorship”: The idea of a “benevolent dictator” will serve as the 
construct for this study.  A benevolent dictator is a ruler who does not necessarily 
follow democratic principles, but who uses his absolute power to better the lives 
of his citizens and improve their existence.  This is similar to the idea of  
“Enlightened Absolutism,” first put forth in the late 19th century by German 
historians.4  For a benevolent dictatorship to work, the ruler must truly act in the 
best interests of the citizens of that country, even if they do not put themselves in 
a position to be removed from power.     
 Benevolent dictators may also work towards the “greater good” as 
opposed to just the “public good.”  Though seemingly similar, these two terms 
carry starkly different connotations that a dictator of any inclination can 
manipulate for his own good.  While a population may call for elections with full 
participation by all, thus making it for the “public good,” a dictator may believe 
(and therefore, act on his belief) that his country is not ready for an election; he 
would therefore be acting in the realm of the “greater good,” or “what is best for 
the nation.”   In the case of Ethiopia, Mengistu used torture, clearly not in the 
public good, which was “justified to enhance the greater good.” 
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4 Charles Ingrao, "The Problem of 'Enlightened Absolutism and the German States," 
Journal of Modern History Vol. 58, Supplement: Politics and Society in the Holy Roman 
Empire, 1500-1806 (December 1986), S161. 
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 Some example outcomes of this behavior include declaring that a certain 
amount of taxes will be collected; that a certain amount of GDP will be spent on 
health or education; prohibiting plastic grocery bags throughout a country to 
reduce pollution, etc.  Generally, these actions are ones that would either not 
come before a committee or panel for discussion because of their perceived 
insignificance, or would take a long time to debate and would end up being 
passed in a different form than they were proposed.   
 A benevolent dictator, acting in the best interests of his people, will not 
put his ideas up for debate, but rather simply declare them law so that they can 
gain greater, more immediate traction.  Of course, one must be wary of any kind 
of dictator, as Lord Acton was right when he said, “Absolute power corrupts 
absolutely.”5  But a benevolent dictatorship may be “the best of what’s available” 
when it comes to Africa. 
“Nation”: A “nation” will be defined as a people and not a delineated 
geographical area (though we often refer to countries as “nations”).  A nation is a 
population with such character traits as a common language, an ethnic identity 
outside of any land boundaries (for example, the Kurdish nation that currently 
resides in Southern Turkey, Northeast Iraq, and Northwest Iran), and a common 
history or “story” that binds them together.  Nations are much more important in 
Africa since “states” were external creations, often ignoring the cultural 
delineations of the nations that already resided there. 
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5 Professor Guy Burgess, in e-mail message to author, October 29, 2011. 
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“State”: Simply put, a state is a formal polity “that is sovereign over its members 
and occupies a well-defined territory.  It is the formal apparatus of authoritative 
roles and law norms through which that sovereignty is exercised.”6  Of note, this 
definition makes no mention of a common language, history, or identity.  It is 
dictators that rule over a state, but it is the nations in his state with which he must 
contend. 
“Product (The End State or Outcome)”: The product will be defined as the 
results of a dictatorship (in the areas of stability and security, economy, health, 
education, the political process) on a state and its citizens. 
Indicator Variables 
1. Basic needs: Improvement to education (Education expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP, literacy rates, % of teachers that are trained), health (life 
expectancy, infant mortality rates, malnutrition, access to water), and economic 
security (Human Development Index, per capita GDP). 
2. Basic freedoms: Freedom of speech (Reporters sans Frontières’ Press 
Freedom Index), stability and security (Foreign Policy’s “Failed States Index”), 
the perception of “honest government” (Corruption Perception Index, Democracy 
Index). 
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6 R.J. Hummel, “Understanding Conflict and War: Vol. 2: The State and Political 
System,” University of Hawaii, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/TCH.CHAP31.HTM 
(accessed December 9, 2011). 
